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Abstract
In 2017, China’s online e-commerce sales has already reached 29.16 trillion Yuan.
While gaining huge benefits, it also poses great challenges for each industry. One
of the biggest challenge is the change of sales channels. Of course, there are
also huge opportunities between them. Among them, it is a huge impact on the
perishable products industry such as the airline industry and the hotel industry.
Because of the perishable of the product, both hotels and airlines want to be able
to sell the product for a limited period of time and gain considerable benefits.
Therefore, at the beginning of the industry, airlines and hotels hoped to sell
their products through more channels and attracted channels to sell products
by paying their commission fee. With the rapid development of e-commerce,
more and more online channels are replacing traditional oﬄine channels. The
change of channels has brought great challenges to airline management and
costs. For example, although online channels absorb more customer demand,
the commission costs of airlines have increased significantly. In addition to the
cost pressures imposed on airlines, the increase in channels has brought conflicts
between channels and between channels and airlines. Some of the channels’
behaviour has caused great losses to the airlines. For example: change the
condition of retreat fee, increase ticket or room price, maliciously reduce the
price to compete with the airline and so on. These behaviours have affected
the airline’s reputation and have also brought losses to the airlines. In order
to deal with the challenges of online agents, the airline has also taken some
corresponding measures, such as the opening of online direct marketing websites,
direct sales APP and so on. However, the effect has not been very good and it
is difficult to compete with online agents who have customer volume.
At the same time, we also see that the airline industry and hotels are also
facing great competitive pressure. For example, the high-speed rail increases the
competitive of civil transport markets. High-speed trains generally have higher
on-time rates than aircraft and also high-speed rail stations are generally more
convenient for customers in the city.Therefore, for passengers, high-speed rail
has advantages in short trips. In addition, the emergence of low-cost airlines
has also intensified competition in the civil aviation industry such as China’s
Spring Airlines , Europe’s Easyjet and Ryanair. Therefore, recently reducing
channel distribution costs has been concerned for many airlines which are facing
fierce competition in airline markets.
In a long period since the 1970s, capacity control has always played a pivotal
role in defining airlines market strategy. However, when airlines select distribu-
tion channels and make capacity allocation decisions, they still separately make
3
different decisions. Hence, when a customer purchases a ticket from a channel
with an appropriate fare class, the channel might not be an optimal channel
from the airlines’ perspective. When the airline sells a ticket in a right channel,
the ticket price is probably not a right fare. Therefore, how to establish a better
channel and fare class capacity control model has become the key for airlines to
increase revenue.
This thesis is a study based on the above issues. The main work includes the
following aspects:
At first, we studied the single-leg capacity allocation problem that considers
the channel factor. Although the network revenue management has a lot of aca-
demic research and has been applied in international routes,for many domestic
routes airlines still basically use single-leg revenue management system.In ad-
dition, from the historical development of revenue management, the single-leg
revenue management model is the basic model of all revenue management mod-
els. Therefore, it is important to first establish a single-leg revenue management
model that considers the channel issues. In this study, we will integrate channel
distribution into dynamic capacity control model. The model can make chan-
nel decisions in conjunction with inventory and this is similar to the procedure
shown in pure capacity allocation. The study has proposed an optimal pol-
icy basing on bid price that incorporates commission fee, price, and capacity.
The numerical experiment results illustrate that introducing the channel distri-
bution into airline revenue system can significantly improve the revenues and
efficiently reduce the channel distribution cost for airlines. The numerical exper-
iments demonstrate that airline revenues will increase more than 3% in a simple
integrated system with two channels compared to the independent model. This
study also analyses the reasons for improvements in different situations (such as
multi-channels have better improvements than a single-channel and the model
has a better match of channels and fare classes) so that management insights
are obtained for airlines.
Secondly, we analyse customer demand behaviours and we find that cus-
tomers will experience demand transfer behaviours when facing channels. In
the Internet age, due to more transparent information, the customer’s trans-
fer behaviour has been continuously expanded. For customers, the transfer of
channels is more likely to occur than the transfer of fare classes because they do
not need to pay for it. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a better revenue
management model to consider the customer’s channel transfer behaviour.In
this part, we added customer channel transfer behaviour based on the origi-
nal single-leg dynamic capacity allocation model that considers channel issues.
We also developed the optimal policy for this model and made some numerical
experiments. The numerical experiments demonstrate that the customer shift
behaviour can influence the results of the model and subsequently the decisions
4 Abstract
of airlines. In the general numerical result, the new model can increase 1.23%
than the above channel model. At the same time, through the analysis of the
results, the airlines are provided with corresponding suggestions to face the
customer’s choice behaviour. For example, the airline needs to increase the cus-
tomer’s transfer rate through some methods, such as joining a price comparison
network and increasing policy incentives.
Thirdly, on the base of single-leg model, we propose a new network dynamic
model to integrate network revenue management and channel distribution. To
take a network structure airline, the airlines can make more revenue benefits
comparing the single-leg method. Although the network dynamic model can
make more improvements, the exact optimization is impossible for practical
purposes because of the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, we use determined
linear programming method for approximating to dynamic model. The numer-
ical experiments demonstrate that the airline revenues can increase more than
3% in a simple network when the commission rate is 15% compared to the
traditional network model.
In addition to the above studies, the paper also summarizes the original liter-
ature on revenue management and channel issues and proposes future research
directions.
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1 Introduction
Revenue management is an important branch of operation management, and it
is also one of the difficulties and hotspots in the management of scientific re-
search. Through the introduction, we can understand our research background,
research motivation, research content, and the theoretical and practical signifi-
cance of this study. At the same time we will give the structural framework of
our study.
1.1 Research background
1.1.1 Airline industry background
The civil aviation industry was the first industry to introduce a revenue man-
agement system. After the United States liberalized regulation of the airline
industry in the 1970s, revenue management systems formally entered the civil
aviation industry. The application of revenue management technology also
brings great profit growth to airlines, and also promotes the development of
American aviation industry.
Table 1.1: Civil aviation routes and number of aircraft statistics in China
Source:China Civil Aviation Statistics (CAST,2017)
1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2014 2017
Scheduled flight routes 437 1165 1880 2290 2457 3142 4418
International routes 44 133 302 443 381 490 803
No.of countries 24 33 54 58 52 48 60
Domestic routes 385 1032 1578 1847 2076 2652 3615
No.of cities 94 139 175 178 180 198 229
Scheduled flight Mileage(104 Km) 50.7 150.3 276.5 349.1 328 463.72 1082.9
International flights 16.6 50.8 107 149.4 128.5 176.72 376.3
Domestic flights 32.9 99.5 169.5 199.6 199.5 287 706.6
Passenger carried(104) 1660 6722 26769 29500 31936 39195 55156
No.of aircraft 204 527 1597 1764 1941 2370 3296
However, China’s aviation market is relatively backward compared to the
European and American aviation market. In the past, some regulatory measures
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on the policy also hindered the development of the civil aviation industry in
China. With the new situation of China’s policy opening up and China’s rapid
economic development, the development of the civil aviation industry has great
potential. From the table 1.1, we can see that in the short 27 years from 1990 to
2017, the civil aviation industry has undergone tremendous changes in China.
In 1990, the number of routes in China was only 437, and there were only 204
civilian aircraft. There were only 24 and 94 airline countries and cities.After
nearly 28 years of development, by the end of 2017, China’s air routes have
increased to 4,418, which has increased by more than 10 times compared to
1990, and international air routes have also increased by 20 times to 490. The
number of civilian aircraft increased by a factor of 15 to 3,296. It can be
seen that China’s civil aviation industry has developed very rapidly in these 20
years. Additionally, in the past 10 years, China’s civil aviation industry has still
developed rapidly. We can also look at the development of China’s civil aviation
industry in the past 10 years through the passenger traffic volume in the figure
1.1. In 2010, China’s civil aviation passenger traffic was 290 million, and by
2017 it was close to 550 million passengers, an increase of nearly 2 times. In
these 10 years, almost every year the volume of passenger traffic has maintained
an increase of more than double digits. As can be seen from the 2016 IATA
annual report(Tyler,2016)(see Figure 1.2),the domestic China passenger market
saw the biggest incremental change in journey numbers, with 37 million more
passenger journeys made in 2016 than in the year before. This increase was
more than in the next two fastest-growing markets,domestic United States and
domestic India combined.
However, behind the rapid development of civil aviation in China, the com-
petition of airlines has increased due to the participation of private aviation and
the development of high-speed railways. In 2013, with the launch of a number
of new high-speed railways, China’s high-speed rail business has reached 11,028
kilometres, and the 12,000-km high-speed railway is under construction. It has
become the world’s longest running high-speed railway and the country with
the largest scale of construction.Due to short-term advantages, high-speed rail
travel has become the first choice for many travellers, and therefore it poses
great challenges for airlines.
The application of domestic airlines in related management techniques such
as revenue management is not yet mature. In addition, due to the rise of
the Internet, especially the development of the mobile Internet, all industries
are facing new challenges and opportunities. Especially for the civil aviation
industry, the Internet channels have completely changed the sales ecology of the
civil aviation industry. Our research is aimed at such a situation. Integrating
channel management into the revenue management system enables airlines to
efficiently use existing resources to increase revenue.
8 1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: China’s aviation passenger traffic volume
Source:China Civil Aviation Statistics( CAST,2017)
Source:IATA annual report(Tyler,2016)
Figure 1.2: Top 10 increasing O-D markets in 2016
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1.1.2 Airline distribution
With the development of e-commerce, many different sales channels have ap-
peared in both traditional manufacturing and service industries. There are
several channels for the traditional industry, such as oﬄine channels Wal-Mart,
Carrefour, online channel channels such as Taobao, JD and many companies
have their direct sales channels, such as Apple, Topshop and so on.For the
service industry, especially the aviation industry and the hotel industry, the
emergence of e-commerce has greatly changed their sales channel model.Take
the civil aviation industry as an example. Before 2000, consumers purchased
airline tickets mainly through oﬄine agents and call centres. It can be seen from
the figure 1.3 that the call center has a very high volume growth in 2000. In
2000, there was almost no increase in online channels. Since 2010, we have seen
almost no increase in the growth of call centres and oﬄine agents. In contrast,
the growth of online channels has reached more than 50%, and in 2015 it has
even reached over 70%. Therefore, we can see from the above data that the
airline’s channel has a great change with the development of e-commerce.In ad-
dition to the new demand for new online channels, the conflict and transparency
brought about by the increase in channels have brought new challenges to the
civil aviation industry.
Source:IATA annual report(Tyler,2016)
Figure 1.3: Customer ticket behaviour in airline industry
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Firstly ,we should introduce the channel structure of airline market, because
the airlines sales channel is different compared with sales channels of traditional
products. Airlines compete tremendously in increasing customer volume and
maintaining market share in a limited time period. Hence, Airlines utilize many
channels to reach customers in order to enhance the sales opportunities in a
structure illustrated in Figure 1.4 (Harteveld,2012).
Figure 1.4: Channel distribution system
Normally, airlines sell their tickets through the Global Distribution Systems
(GDSs), such as Sabre, Amadeus and Worldspan. A GDS is an intermedi-
ate company between travel service companies (such as airlines, hotels) and
travel agents. GDSs collect information of airlines concerning supply inven-
tory and price, then provide such information to travel agents and thereafter
charge service fee to airlines. After retrieving information from GDSs, the indi-
rect channel which includes off-line travel agents, online agents (such as Ctrip
and Qunar in China, Priceline.com in USA and Opodo in Europe) and tour
operators will receive tickets requests from customers. The commission fee of
one ticket requested by travel agencies can vary from zero to 20% (including
the GDS fee). In the highly competitive civil aviation sector, this has brought
great costs to the airlines. Direct channels include airline websites, call centre
and corporate travel clients. There is almost no cost for airlines. Therefore,
some airlines have adopted strategies to increase the sales proportion of di-
rect channel, such as improving the quality of website and increasing some
ancillary service (Lufthansa,2005). In the IATA 2016 channel distribution re-
port, 49 civil aviation executives were surveyed. One of the questions is asking
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what will happen to the distribution of channels(See figure 1.5). Increasing the
direct sales channel got the highest score, followed by the application of the
new revenue management system. From this perspective, it can also be shown
that direct sales channels and revenue management are directly affecting civil
aviation revenue in the opinion of civil aviation professional managers.
Source:The future of airline distribution,report by(Harteveld,2016)
Figure 1.5: Airlines believe some distribution disruption will occur by 2021
However, it is not easy to increase the use of direct sales channels. We can
see that in the 2012 IATA report (See Figure 1.6), the direct sales channels
at that time were around 40%, while the indirect channels were above 55%.
The report also gives a forecast for the 2017 civil aviation channel based on the
opinions of civil aviation executives. Civil aviation companies hope to increase
direct sales channels to 55% and indirect channels to 45%. However, in the 2016
report(See Figure 1.7), we found that the use of direct sales channels did not
improve and remained basically the same as in 2012. Therefore, travel agents
are still dominant in the channel distribution in airline industries.
There are three main reasons for this situation(Harteveld,2016). The busi-
ness model of GDS could have been changed by airlines, but in the end it has
not changed as a result of a profitable distributor. Second, airlines lack the will
to transfer channel costs to travel agents. Because according to the traditional
method of revenue management, aviation managers often ignore the cost and
concern about the benefits. Finally, airlines often subcontract the channel dis-
12 1 Introduction
Source:The future of airline distribution,report by (Harteveld,2012)
Figure 1.6: Global channel share volume,2012-2017
Source:The future of airline distribution,report by (Harteveld,2016)
Figure 1.7: Global channel share volume,2017-2021
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tribution system to GDS in order to reduce IT investment, making it difficult
for airlines to control the channels. Under this current situation, airlines have
to pay a large amount of commission fee for the indirect channel distribution
every year. Therefore, as competition intensifies and channel conflicts intensify,
how to adjust the channel structure to reduce costs and reduce conflicts has
become a focus issue from the perspective of some airline companies.
1.2 The concept of revenue management
Revenue management has been widely practised for allocating perishable as-
sets in service industries such as the airlines, car rentals and hotels since the
deregulation of the airline industry in the 1970s. In the beginning, revenue
management is used typically to determine how many seats should be reserved
and offered for each class at different prices in one aircraft cabin. Since the
application of this management technology, American airlines have acquired
more profits in 1980s during which period almost all other airlines had a great
deficit. Revenue management is a management technology that maximizes rev-
enue, mainly by subdividing market demand, analysing consumer behaviours,
establishing effective forecasting models, and determining the best selling prices
and capacity for different consumers. There are four main application technolo-
gies for revenue management, which are also in the four directions of research:
demand forecast, overbooking, dynamic pricing and capacity allocation.
Demand forecast:Demand forecasting is an important tool for revenue man-
agement. Accurate forecasting will provide data support for later overbooking
management, pricing and inventory control. The main research methods in-
clude qualitative forecasting, time series, regression analysis and other statistical
methods.
Overbooking: Overbooking means that more products are sold than actual
products. As some customers may not arrive or cancel reservations during the
sale of perishable goods such as air tickets, airlines will lose part of their profits.
Therefore, airlines will adopt an overbooking strategy to offset this loss.
Dynamic pricing:Dynamic pricing refers to the strategy of the company to
sell different products to different customers or different market segments at
different prices according to market demand and its own supply capacity at dif-
ferent prices to maximize profit. This strategy distinguishes the previous static
pricing strategies by meeting the market’s needs by changing the differential
prices at different times and in different markets.
Capacity allocation: Capacity allocation refers to the allocation of appropri-
ate product quantities for different price levels. Since dynamic pricing usually
takes into account the reaction of competitors, capacity allocation is more of a
revenue management technology controlled by the enterprise itself.
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Although the four core technologies constitute revenue management, the core
issue of revenue management is actually when and how much sold to whomever,
which is the inventory control model. The research and development of the
inventory control problem is mainly composed of two parts. First, it is a single
resource issue, such as a single flight seat booking problem in airline industry,
a hotel room booking problem in one night. The other is the multiple resource
issue, which is what we call the network problem, such as the O&D airline
network problem or the hotel room reservation problem for a period of time.
In our research, a new capacity control model considering multiple channel
factors was constructed based on the single resource and multiple resources
issues, respectively.
Here we briefly introduce the application process of revenue management
system. As shown in the figure 1.8, first of all, the airline will conduct data col-
lection such as customer booking history, product data, and pricing data. The
collected data is then input into the forecasting system to predict customer de-
mand and behaviour. Then using the forecast data, the dynamic pricing system
and the inventory control system are optimized to obtain price and inventory
for each period. During this period, forecast data is used to decide whether
to use the overbooking strategy and overbook the quantity. Then through the
reservation system, different levels of price and inventory are released to each
distribution system, such as GDS, airline website and call centre.
We can see that in the original revenue management process, the optimiza-
tion part of the revenue management model did not consider the underlying
channel issues at all. In fact, many channels will affect the airline’s revenue and
even make the revenue management system useless. Therefore, the research in
this paper puts the channel problem into the revenue management system and
optimizes it in a unified way to avoid the conflict between the channel and the
revenue system.
This section is a brief introduction to revenue management. Specific related
content can refer to the relevant book "Pricing and revenue optimization"
(Phillips,2005) and "The theory and practice of revenue management" (Tal-
luri and Van Ryzin,2006).
1.3 Customer shift behaviour
Similarly, based on the development of the Internet, customers can obtain more
product information through more channels. Especially with the emergence of
some comparison websites like Skyscanner in Europe, Priceline in American and
Qunar in China, customers can obtain almost all ticket information from every
channel through a website. As figure 1.9, if customer want to buy a flight ticket
from Shanghai to Frankfurt, the customer can obtain the ticket information
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Source:(Talluri and Van Ryzin,2006)
Figure 1.8: Revenue management process flow
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and channel information from the Skyscanner. Therefore, the airline’s product
information is becoming more transparent.
Figure 1.9: Price comparison website
Source: Skyscanner Website
And precisely because of the increase of information transparency, the cus-
tomer’s choice behaviour has a greater impact on airlines and channel manu-
facturers. Revenue management is the most important technology to deal with
this challenge. Therefore, this concept of customer choice behaviour is pro-
posed. Specifically, the customer’s choice behaviour is that when the customer
purchases an airline ticket, the demand shifts due to the impact of the infor-
mation. Many scholars have incorporated customer selection behaviours into
revenue management models. The most important of these is the two streams.
The first is the customer’s buy-up behaviour. When the customer is rejected or
the low-level customer chooses to purchase upwards under certain conditions.
The other is the choice model. The airline no longer provides a single product
for different customers but provides a set of products for their selection. For
the channel issues considered in this paper, the customer’s choice behaviour has
a greater impact on airline’s revenue. When customers choose high-grade fares,
their costs will increase, so there may not be many customers who choose to buy
upwards. When customers choose low-cost channels such as airline direct sales
channels, their cost will not increase and the transfer between channels is more
likely to happen.So we consider the customer’s choice behaviour in Chapter 4
in our model. More specific, Strauss et al. review the related theory and model
in his paper(Strauss et al.,2018).
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1.4 Research objective and motivations
This research addresses the capacity allocation problem in different distribu-
tion channels with the airline industry as the background. In existing systems
and models (see Figure 1.8), airlines use their revenue management system to
select the capacity and price in different fare classes, and then the decisions of
capacity and price are provided through indirect channels (Global Distribution
Systems(GDSs) and travel agents) and direct channels (Airline websites). After
that, customers can purchase tickets from travel agents or airline websites. In
such a system, airlines use their revenue management system to optimize the
inventory without considering the effects of distribution channels. Demand from
different channels is always fulfilled, if possible, with the first come, first serve
rule. At the same time, the travel agencies, without informing the airline com-
pany, always execute their capacity strategy with the aim of increasing their own
profits. Some travel agencies even increase the product’s price or decrease some
fare capacities. This decentralized marketing strategy associated with travel
agencies can sometimes damage the airline’s revenue management system, and
as a consequence, it even reduces the airline’s revenues and increases the costs.
Source:The future of airline distribution,report by (Harteveld,2012)
Figure 1.10: Distribution business issues frustrate airline executives
One survey of the distribution channel issues with airline executives demon-
strates that apart from the costs of indirect channels including GDS’s fees
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and the commission fees of travel agencies, airline executives are also frus-
trated by the inadequate policy transparency of travel agencies that may of-
ten conflict with the aim of the revenue management policies of the airlines
(Harteveld,2012). Thus, some airlines cut off all channels for lowering the costs
and avoiding the conflict. For instance, some low-cost carriers (LCCs) only
sell on their own websites. However, one immediate disadvantage is the loss
of customers due to lack of indirect channels. Thus, some LCCs have tried to
return to the traditional airline sales system. The example of LCCs implies
that eliminating all indirect channels is not the best strategy to confront the
market environment. It is significant for the airlines to establish an efficient ca-
pacity allocation model that integrates the revenue management system and the
channel distribution system so that the decisions and optimization have a wider
reach in order to cover interrelated issues in revenue management and channel
distribution simultaneously. With the support of such a system, the airlines can
allocate cabin capacity in different fare classes and different channels based on
selling seasons and demand.
Therefore, the key question is
"How to integrate the channel distribution into revenue management system
to reduce the cost and avoid conflicts with channels?"
More specifically, three research questions were addressed:
RQ1: how to integrate the channel factors into single-leg capacity allocation
model?
-What is the current situation of single-leg capacity allocation model? -What
is the new integration model? -What are the properties of the new model?
RQ2: how does the customer behaviour effect on the new model and how to
solve it?
-What is the buy-up customer behaviour? -How to definite the buy-up be-
haviour in the new model?
RQ3: how to integrate the channel factors into network capacity allocation
model?
-What is situation of the network capacity allocation? -What is the network
integration model? -what are the properties of the network model?
There are plenty of literature on airlines’ capacity allocation and channel
distribution. But seldom research focus on the integration of channel factor
and capacity allocation. However, in the reality, airlines have a deep effect on
their revenues because of channel factor. Therefore this study proposes three
new solutions to the original three basic revenue management problems, namely
the single-leg problem, the single-leg problem taking into account the customer’s
buy-up behaviour, and network problem.
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1.5 Research content and structure
The main research content and distribution of this thesis are as follows:
In Chapter 1, the research mainly analyse the background of the development
of the civil aviation industry and the current status of the channels. This is also
the source of research and motivation for this study. At the same time, a brief
introduction to the concept of revenue management is introduced. After that,
the research introduce the customer choice behaviour. Finally, the content of
the research and the structure of the paper are introduced.
In Chapter 2, we review four parts of academic research, namely single-leg
revenue management, network revenue management, revenue management mod-
els for customer choice behaviour, and channel allocation related literature.
Through summarizing and analysing the existing academic research, this paper
proposes the contribution of this study to the academic field.
In Chapter 3, we propose a dynamic model to describe the decision behaviours
when revenue management and channel distribution management in single-leg
are integrated from the airlines’ perspective. To enhance revenue management,
we introduce factors to describe the channel distribution characteristics into a
dynamic programming model. The model proposes a two-decision mechanism
in the presence of the demand for one seat. One decision chooses the fare class,
and the other selects the channel. With this fundamental mechanism in the
model, we use the bid-price optimal policy to ensure that the airline maximizes
their revenues. The new model can make airlines allocate the capacity efficiently
among both different fare classes and different channels based on the demand
and sales period.
This Chapter makes three contributions in the literature. First, we propose
a dynamic capacity control model that integrates the revenue management and
channel distribution decisions. The modelling framework can be further used
for other relevant issues in the airlines. Second, we develop the optimal policy
for the airlines on the basis of this model. The results can be implemented in
practice. The numerical experiments demonstrate that airline revenues will in-
crease more than 3% in a simple integrated system with two channels compared
to the independent model. Further improvement is possible in more compli-
cated situations. This study also analyses the reasons for improvements in
different situations (such as multi-channels have better improvements than a
single-channel and the model has a better match of channels and fare classes)
so that management insights are obtained for airlines.
In Chapter 4,we further extend the study to consider the customer shift be-
haviours after being rejected by high-cost channels. The goal is to show how the
customer shift behaviours influence our two-decision mechanism. Those mod-
els and mechanisms well reflect the airlines’ decision behaviour and customer
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behaviour with the consideration of the channel distribution effect. Therefore,
the results of this study can enhance the decision-making process of the airlines
for the capacity allocation problem.
The numerical experiments demonstrate that the customer shift behaviour
can influence the results of the model and subsequently the decisions of airlines.
At the same time, through the analysis of the results, the airlines are provided
with corresponding suggestions to better face the customer’s choice behaviour.
For example, how can an airline change when faced with different needs, and
the purchase of a model by a customer can increase the airline’s acceptance
rate.
In Chapter 5,on the base of single-leg model, we propose a new network
dynamic model to integrate network revenue management and channel distri-
bution. To take a network structure airline, the airlines can make more rev-
enue benefits comparing the single-leg method. This has been demonstrated
by several researchers such asBelobaba and Lee(2000p),Belobaba(2001r),
Williamson(1988c) and Williamson(1992a). Although the network dynamic
model can make more improvements, the exact optimization is impossible for
practical purposes because of the curse of dimensionality. Therefore, we use
determined linear programming method for approximating to dynamic model.
This Chapter also makes three contributions in the literature. First, we pro-
pose a new network dynamic model which considered channel factor. Second,
we develop an approximation method for the airlines. These methods can be di-
rectly used in airline industries. Third, the numerical experiments demonstrate
that the airline revenues can increase more than 3% in a simple network when
the commission rate is 15% compared to the traditional network model.
In Chapter 6, the research results of this study are summarized and the con-
tribution of this thesis in the academic field and application field is elaborated.
Finally, it points out the research insufficiency and further research direction.
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Figure 1.11: Structure of the Thesis
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2 Literature review
Through the introduction of the development of the civil aviation industry and
the problems existing in the civil aviation channel in Chapter 1, we have ini-
tially understood the significance of integrating revenue management issues with
channels. In this chapter we plan to determine the theoretical theory of this
study by reviewing relevant academic research. We separately reviewed the
literature on four relevant aspects, namely single-leg capacity control, network
capacity control, capacity control considering consumer behaviour, and related
research on channel distribution.
2.1 Single-leg revenue management
As mentioned before, capacity control as a traditional and significant aspect of
revenue management has been reported in many studies. The earliest research
on capacity control was Littlewood(1972) which proposed a static model for
two fare classes on a single flight leg. Since then, many scholars have conducted
research on the issue of single flight leg and have mainly divided into several
issues (See Table 2.1). The first is the single-leg dual-class problem, which is
what Littlewood(1972) has proposed. Bahatia et al.(1973) and Richter(1982)
used different methods to derive the Littlwood rule. Mayer(1976) and Titze and
Griesshaber(1983) separately conducted a simulation study of performance of
Littlewood’s rule. Mayer implied that if the Littlewood rule was reused before
the flight took off, its effect might be the same as that of a more complex DP
model. Titze and Griesshaber proved that the Littlewood rule is robust under
the assumption of low to high fare.
Based on the two fare class single-leg model, Belobaba (1987a,b,1989) ex-
tended the two fare classes model to multiple fare classes model and developed
an effective heuristics solution (EMSR, expected marginal seat revenue) to solve
this single-leg problem. McGill(1989) and Wollmer proved that the approxima-
tion result is roughly good in some typical demand distribution based on the
EMSR method . However, for general demand distribution, Robinson(1995)
gave a evidence that the result is poor.After that, Van and McGill improved
the EMSR method and proposed a close method EMSRb. The approximation
result of EMSRb was closer to the result of optimal booking limits. EMSRb
is then widely used in airline industries although they did not give an opti-
mal booking limits. For obtaining optimal booking limits, some literatures
provided different methods. Curry(1990) obtained the optimal booking lim-
its in continuous demand distribution and Wollmer(1992) obtained the optimal
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Table 2.1: Single leg capacity allocation literature
Category Year Author
Static single leg two-class model
1972 LITTLEWOOD
1973 Bhatia and Parekh
1976 Mayer
1982 Richter
1983 Titze and Griesshaber
Static single leg Multi-class model
1987a Belobaba
1987b Belobaba
1989 Belobaba
1989 McGill
1990 Curry
1993 Brumelle and McGill
1992 Wollmer
1995 Robinson
1998 Van and McGillVan Ryzin and McGill
Dynamic single leg model
1993 Lee and Hersh
1994 Shaykevich
1994 Young and Van Slyke
1997 Brumelle and Walczak
1998 Kleywegt and Papastavrou
1999 Zhao
1999 Subramanian et al.
1999 Liang
1999 Lautenbacher and Stidham Jr
1999 Zhao
2000 Van Slyke and Young
2001 Kleywegt and Papastavrou
2003 Brumelle and Walczak
2009 Gallego et al.
2010 Han et al.
2012 Aydın et al.
2015 Arslan et al.
2016 Aydın et al.
2017 Hopman et al.
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booking limits in discrete demand distribution. Brumelle and McGill(1993)
used sub-differential optimization to obtain the optimal booking limits both in
continuous and discrete demand distribution. Van Ryzin and McGill(2000) pro-
posed a multiple nested fare class model to find the booking limits. Additionally,
this method did not need demand forecasting.
Dynamic programming model(DP) relaxed the low to high booking arrival
order compared as static model. Lee and Hersh (1993) developed a dynamic
single-leg model, which is the first study in DP model. Apart from the above
mentioned literature, there are some other academic papers related to dy-
namic single-leg capacity control, such as Shaykevich(1994), Young and Van
Slyke(1994), Brumelle and Walczak (1997),Kleywegt and Papastavrou(1998),
Zhao and Zheng(1998),Brumelle and Walczak(1998), Lautenbacher and Stid-
ham (1999), Liang (1999), Subramanian et al. (1999), Zhao (1999) and Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004). Among these, Lautenbacher and Stidham prove the
monotonicity of the discrete time DP model and unified the dynamic and static
model. Liang(1999) propose a continues-time dynamic model and Van Slyke
and Young(2000) also give a result of continuous-time version of Lee and Hersh
dynamic model. After that, Subramanian et al.(1999) extended the DP model
to integrate cancellations, no-shows and overbooking. Apart from the Lee and
Hersh DP model, Kleywegt and Papastavrou(1998) proposed a dynamic and
stochastic knapsack problem(DSKP). On the base of his own model, they ex-
tended DSKP model to incorporate the batch arrivals. Apart from these, there
are some recent research on dynamic model, such as Han et al.(2010), Aydın
et al.(2012),Arslan et al.(2015), Aydın et al.(2016) and Hopman et al.(2017). A
review of these single-leg model can be found in McGill and Van Ryzin(1999,
Sec.4), Pak and Piersma(2002,Sec.3) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2006, Chapter
3).
Apart from the airline industry, some non-service industries have widely dis-
cussed the capacity control problem. Barut and Sridharan (2004) proposed
a dynamic capacity allocation procedure model (DCAP) in the make-to-order
(MTO) manufacturing environment. The DCAP model dynamically allocates
short-term constrained capacity to multiple product classes in multiple periods.
Barut and Sridharan (2005) further extended the former DCAP model by re-
laxing two assumptions. We need to note that there are some similarities and
differences between the DCAP model and our model. Obviously, the application
of the DCAP model has a focus on the manufacturing industries (especially for
make-to-order manufacturing processes). In this case, the demand for each fare
class is not necessarily unit-sized. Thus, when a large-sized order for a high
value class is rejected, a small-sized order for a low value class can be accepted,
given that there is available capacity. Conversely, in our model, a maximum of
one customer comes in each time period. When the system rejects a customer
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in a high value class, the revenue will be directly lost. Furthermore, our model
considered the multi-channel effect on capacity control in the airline industry,
whereas the channel effect is not included in the DCAP models.
2.2 Revenue management with customer-shift behaviour
The earliest study to consider the customer’s upward shift was proposed by
Belobaba(1989), who analyzed the customer’s upward purchasing behaviour in
his EMSR model. After that, Weatherford et al.(1993), Brumelle et al.(1990)
and Pferifer(1989) took the buy-up factor into consideration. The above model
assumes that there are only two fare classes, that is the static models we intro-
duced earlier in the single-leg literature. The specific introduction of the static
model will appear in Chapter 4. Based on the static model, You(2001)and
You(2003) extended the buy-up factor into the dynamic model. Shumsky
and Zhang (2003) studied a cross-time capacity allocation with buy-up fac-
tor. Wen(2001) considered the no-show based on the customer buy-up model
The above literature is mainly to discuss the customer’s buy-up behaviour
under single-leg condition. In addition, there are some literatures that study
the influence of customer behaviour on the network model. Andersson(1998)
proposed a linear programming model for the network problem considering buy-
up model. Buke et al(2008) use a stochastic programming approximation to
describe the buy-up network problem. Jiang and Miglioico(2014) proposed a
dynamic programming network model and use several approximation method
to solve it.
The above is some study influence on the customer’s buy-up behaviour. Of
course there are some revenue management models that take into account the
customer’s choice behaviour. Instead of using buy-up factor, they use a set of
choices, often called choice model. For example, Talluri et al.(2004) proposed
the choice model on the base of single-leg model. After that, Liu(2008) extend
the choice-based single-leg model to network model and give a approximation
method to solve it. After this, there are others who have studied it, like Bront et
al.(2009), Kunnumkal(2010), Zhang(2009), Meissner and Strauss(2012),Sierag
and van der Mei(2016) and Feldman and Topaloglu(2017). Because this di-
rection is not the main direction of our research, we will not elaborate on it.
More specifically, Strauss et al. reviewed the related literature and introduced
the theory and model. However, because the choice model is too complex and
takes too long to run on actual problems, it is difficult to apply it in the airline’s
revenue management system. All related literature has been listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Customer-shift behaviour literature
Year Author year Author
1989 Pfeifer 2003 You
1989 Belobaba 2009 Shumsky and Zhang
1990 Brumelle et al. 2008 Büke et al.
1993 Weatherford et al. 2006 Cooper et al.
1998 Andersson 2004 Talluri and Van Ryzin
1999 McGill and Van Ryzin 2012 Cooper and Li
2001 You 2014 Jiang and Miglionico
2001 Zhao and Zheng 2009 Bront et al.
2010 Kunnumkal and Topaloglu 2009 Zhang and Adelman
2012 Meissner and Strauss 2014 Talluri
2016 Sierag and van der Mei 2017 Feldman and Topaloglu
2018 Strauss et al.
2.3 Network Revenue Management
Compared with single-leg flight, network revenue management evolved slightly
later. With the rapid development of the civil aviation industry, especially the
rapid development of the airline’s hub-and-spoke network, the research on the
network factors of revenue management has become increasingly important.
Therefore, our research also integrates channel factors into network revenue
management. Below we will review the relevant literature on network revenue
management.
In academic literature(see Table 2.3), the earliest research on network revenue
problem are Glover et al.(1982), D’Sylva(1982), Wang(1983), Dror et al.(1988).
Glover et al.(1982) proposed a deterministic network minimum cost flow model,
which is the first study on network effect. Dror et al. extended the de-
terministic network minimum cost flow model to consider the cancellations.
This type of model is also the earliest deterministic linear programming(DLP)
model.In addition to the above studies, Wong also studied the DLP model.
Wong(1990) proposed a single fare network RM model. On the base of this
study, Wong et al.(1993) compared different cabin assignment methods under
the single fare case. Additionally, Willamson(1992) discuss the DLP model
in extensive simulation studies. Wollmer(1986) developed a linear program-
ming model with stochastic demand, which is the first research on probabilistic
2.3 Network Revenue Management 27
Table 2.3: Network capacity allocation literature
Year Author year Author
1982 D’Sylva 2000 Kuyumcu and Garcia-Diaz
1982 Glover et al.Glover et al. 1998 Chen et al.
1983 Wang 1999 McGill and Van Ryzin
1986 Wollmer 1999 Ciancimino et al.
1988 Dror et al. 1999 Chen et al.
1988 Wysong 1999 De Boer et al.
1988 Smith and Penn 2001 Feng and Xiao
1988 Williamson 2002 Cooper
1989 Simpson 2001 Cooper
1990 Wong 2003 Bertsimas and Popescu
1991 Phillips et al. 2003 Bertsimas and Shioda
1992 Williamson 2003 Brumelle and Walczak
1990 Curry 2004 Möller et al.
1993 Wong et al. 2004 El-Haber and El-Taha
1994 Phillips 2005 Bertsimas and De Boer
1999 Talluri and Van Ryzin 2006 Klein
2008 Reiman and Wang 2009 Zhang and Adelman
2009 Topaloglu 2012 Meissner and Strauss
2015 Vossen and Zhang 2015 Kirshner and Nediak
2017 Feldman and Topaloglu
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nonlinear programming model(PNLP). Cinacimino et al.(1999) developed a spe-
cialized nonlinear programming algorithm to solve the PNLP problem. Chen
et al.(1999) combined DLP and PNLP approximations to get the bid-price.
Apart from these two approximations, Smith and Penn(1988) first proposed
the randomized linear programming approximation method(RLP) and Talluri
and van Ryzin(1999) investigated the detail of RLP. The most relevant and
closest to the reality yet least reviewed model for network revenue management
is the dynamic network model which was proposed by Talluri and Ryzin(1999).
Bertsimas and Popescu(2003) extended the proposed algorithm to handle can-
cellations and no-shows. Klein proposed a concept of self-adjusting bid price
to solve the network dynamic programming problem. The detail of dynamic
network model and related approximation method also can be found in Talluri
and van Ryzin(2006).
The existing literature on the capacity allocation with multi-channel is quite
limited in revenue management. Most of the research work on revenue manage-
ment assume that channel cost is not considered and the airlines directly face to
the customers. Hence, some literatures integrated the customer behaviour into
the revenue management. Zhang and Cooper(2005) considered customer choice
behaviour among parallel flights. Talluri and Van Ryzin(2004) proposed a ba-
sic choice-based single-leg revenue management model. Liu and Talluri(2008)
developed a approximation method for the network choice-based capacity allo-
cation model, which is called Choice-based deterministic linear programming.
And they studied a column generation algorithm to solve it. After that some au-
thors has focused on the choice-based network model, such as Bront et al.(2009),
Kunnumkal et al.(2010), Zhang et al. (2009)and Meissner and Strauss(2012)
Talluri(2014) and Gallego et al.(2014). As we have said above, it is assumed
that the airline directly faces the customer. However, in reality, half proportion
of ticket are sold by indirect channels and every airlines pay a lot of commis-
sion fee to indirect channel every year. Therefore, the behaviour of the channel
is often more important than the behaviour of the customer. However, most
of the literature on network revenue management ignored the channel’s effect
on airlines’ revenue. Additionally, some researches on other aspect of network
revenue management, such asTopaloglu(2009),Vossen and Zhang(2015) and Kir-
shner and Nediak(2015). A review of these network literatures can be found in
McGill and Van Ryzin(1999), Pak and Piersma(2002), Chiang et al.(2006) and
Talluri and Van Ryzin(2006). We also review the detail of dynamic network
model(Bertsimas and Popescu,2003) and some approximations method which
related in our research in Chapter 5.
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2.4 Multi-Channel distribution
Before the advent of e-commerce, research on channels was rare, especially in
the aviation industry. Because the original channel of the civil aviation in-
dustry mainly distributes resources to various travel agencies or ticket agents
through the GDS system. Due to the fact that civil aviation’s own channels
are affected by the cost, market share is not large, such as call centres and out-
let stores. With the rapid development of e-commerce, the transparency and
convenience brought by online ticketing have made it quickly become the main
channels for customers. At the same time, it also gives airlines the opportunity
to face customers directly, such as building up direct sales websites and launch-
ing direct sales Apps(Buhalis and O’Connor,2006). The Internet-based sales
mode brings opportunities and challenges to airlines. Below the last part of
the literature review is some research on multi-channel issues, which has been
mentioned widely in traditional manufacturing products marketing literature
since the rapid development of e-commerce.
In airlines, multi-channel distribution has been implemented for many
years(see Table 2.4), but only few studies have focused on the effect of multi-
channel distribution on airlines revenues. Jarach (2002) showed that internet-
based ticketing in airlines would bring some changes for airline companies
through the analysis of the impact on the e-commerce-oriented airline. Toh
and Raven(2003) was the first to focus on the impact of the channel on the
airline’s revenue and suggested that the Integrated Internet marketing concept
(IIM) wanted to integrate inventory, prices, markets, and channels into one
system. However, they just put forward an idea and conducted a channel im-
pact analysis, and did not propose a specific model. Shon et al. (2003) proposed
that online channels would dominate the tickets market compared to traditional
channels. Alamdari and Mason (2006) demonstrated that changes were taking
place in airline distribution and predicated that the direct channels would sub-
stantially increase in the airlines. Through an empirical survey on customers,
Yoon et al. (2006) discovered that the airlines’ e-commerce activity might have
important effects on their ticket distribution channels. Castillo-Manzano, et al.
(2010) analysed the customer choice behaviour in purchasing air tickets from
the traditional channel and online channel. In our paper, we will also discuss the
impacts of airlines operations management on air ticket distribution channels.
Ruiz-Mafe et al. (2009) and Bigne et al. (2010) studied the motivation and bar-
riers for customers to purchase tickets on websites. Koo et al.(2011) proposed a
decision support model to analysis the relationship between the direct channel
and indirect channel like online travel agency(OTA). They found that when the
customers had loyalty, the airline liked to use direct channel rather than OTA.
Otherwise, the OTAs have competitive. Wei Yihua(2008) has discussed the
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Table 2.4: Multi-Channel literature
Objective Year Author
Airline
2002 Jarach
2003 Shon et al.
2003 Toh and Raven
2004 Hornick
2006 Alamdari and Mason
2006 Yoon et al.
2005 Buhalis and O’Connor
2008 Wei Yihua
2009 Ruiz-Mafe et al.
2010 Castillo-Manzano and López-Valpuesta
2010 Bigné et al.
2011 Koo et al.
2001 Smith et al.
Hotel 2002 Choi and Kimes
2005 Rao and Smith
Manufacturer
2003 Chiang et al.
2003 Yao and Liu
2004 Wallace et al.
2005 Alptekinoğlu and Tang
2004 Barut and Sridharan
2005 Barut and Sridharan
2014 Xie et al.
Marketing 2005 Rangaswamy and Van Bruggen
Overview 2004 Simchi-Levi et al.
2008 Agatz et al.
Railway 2014 Cheng and Huang
Tourism 2015 Fountoulaki et al.
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pricing problem for revenue management with multiple channel. Apart from
the airline industry, some studies have also investigated same channel distri-
bution issues in similar industries such as hotels and high speed rails. Choi
and Kimes (2002) conducted some simulations to testify the effects of electronic
distributions on hotel revenue management. Rao and Smith(2005) use decision
support model to hotel channel distribution. Cheng and Huang (2014) adopted
an empirical survey for Taiwan high speed rail industry to identify the ticketing
channel preference for customers. Fountoulaki et al. (2015) reported the new
channel distribution for travel and tourism using on the case of Crete.
Compared with perishable asset industries(like airline, hotel and railway),
channel sales in manufacturing are also affected by e-commerce. Therefore,
there are also some manufacturing documents that we can refer to. Chiang
et al.(2003) study the issue of multi-channel design. They found that direct
sales channels will bring more profits to manufacturers. After that, Yao and
Liu(2003) and Wallace et al.(2004) both study the effect of direct channel on
traditional channel and prove that the direct channel will make the market sys-
tem stable under some conditions. Xie et al.(2014) proposed a model integrate
the capacity allocation and channel distribution in traditional manufacturing
system. An overview of manufacturing multi-channel literature can be found in
Simchi-Levi et al. (2004)
The detail of literature on multi-channel also can be found in Agatz et
al.(2008), Boyd and Bilegan(2003).
2.5 Summary
Since the 1970s, academic research on revenue management has been going on
for more than 40 years. With the development of the civil aviation market
and the development of computer technology, the revenue management model
has evolved from the original static two-class single-leg model to the current
dynamic multi-class network model. At the same time, the study of revenue
management has a profound influence on the industry, so it is also generally
taken seriously by the industry. However, when we see that in the Internet
era, more and more manufacturing companies have undergone transformation
and upgrading to adapt to the development of the Internet such as online and
oﬄine coordination. As an airline core system, the revenue management system
still continues the characteristics of the previous century and does not keep up
with the development of the Internet age. Because of this, many professional
managers are eager to have a new revenue management system[52] and academic
researchers need to integrate Internet characteristics into a revenue management
system to provide guidance for practice managers through empirical and model
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studies. However, through the above literature review, we find that there are
some deficiencies in the current theoretical research in this area:
(1) There is a lack of analysis of channel costs in the revenue management
literature. There may be two reasons. First, the basic assumption of revenue
management is to consider revenue without considering costs. Because both civil
aviation and hotels, their fixed costs far exceed the variable costs, so it is usually
assumed that every seat are only considered revenue. However, with the rapid
development of civil aviation industry and increased competition, especially the
emergence of low-cost carrier, more and more airlines are paying attention to
variable costs. The cost of the channel accounts for most of the variable cost
of the airline, because the airline pays a part of the agency fee for each ticket
sold through the agency channel(Toh and Raven,2003). The second reason is
that the original civil aviation channels are almost monopolized. All the tickets
are distributed to the agents through GDS, and the agents sold the products to
customers. Airlines do not have better channels to face customers directly, so
they usually choose to ignore this part of management. Therefore, we found that
almost all the revenue management literature, whether it is single-leg or network
capacity allocation, did not discuss the issue of channel cost. However, the rapid
development of Internet channels has caused the above two reasons to disappear.
At the same time, it also gives airlines the opportunity to face customers through
direct channels.As a result, airlines need to integrate channels into company
management and develop new revenue management systems.
Therefore, the research of this paper is mainly to combine channel manage-
ment and revenue management. Through the overall balance of channel costs
and airline ticket revenues, total airline revenue has been increased.
(2) There is a lack of analysis of customer choice behaviour when they face the
channel in the literature. Most of the revenue management literature assume
that the customer is directly facing the airlines. However, the study of the airline
market chain shows that more than half of flight tickets are sold by different
channels. Therefore, customer behaviour in the channel side greatly influences
the airline’s control of the channel.
Therefore, this study analysis the research on the channel side and proposes
customer behaviour with channel transfer behaviour. On this basis, we have
improved the original channel revenue management model to improve the ap-
plication of the model.
(3)The airline channel distribution literature lacks applicability and operabil-
ity. Although there is literature investigating the airline channel distribution,
such studies seldom coordinate the revenue management system. Most of the
airline channel distribution literature recognizes that the distribution costs need
to be reduced for airlines, but few of them propose detailed solutions to achieve
this.
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Therefore, Our research focuses on channel allocation and management at the
operational levels. We combined the inventory control model with the channel
control and dynamically control the capacity within the channel and the fare
class in each time period to achieve the purpose of reducing channel costs and
increasing revenue.
(4)Because traditional network models usually is complex and hard to solve,
they lack integrated design and research of channel issues. The traditional
network model also needs to use the approximation method to solve, such as
DLP, PNLP, RLP and other approximation models. If you integrate the channel
control problem, the model may be more complicated. But as we have said
before, if the channel issues are not integrated with the revenue management
issues, then each individual decision may bring losses to the airlines.
Therefore, our research propose a dynamic network capacity allocation model
which integrating multi-channel factors. Additionally, we applied a linear pro-
gramming model to approximate it and make the problem easy to solve. That
make the model more applicable.
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3 Dynamic capacity allocation for single-leg with Multi-Channel
distribution
3.1 Single-leg capacity allocation model
In this section, we will first introduce traditional single leg capacity control and
booking control policies. Normally, single leg capacity control model has two
stream: static solution method and dynamic solution methods. The biggest
distinguish between static models and dynamic models is the customer arrival
process. Static single leg solution methods assume that the customer arrives in
order of increasing fare class(See figure 3.1). For instance, low value customer
arrives before high value customer.
Figure 3.1: Static solution booking process.
In contrast, dynamic solution methods assume that the booking requests is
not in order of increasing fare class. At any moment, customers with different
needs have a chance to arrive. The dynamic system decides whether to accept
the customer through the marginal price.(See figure 3.2) The static solution
methods are described in section 3.1.1 and the dynamic solution methods are
described in section 3.1.2
3.1.1 Traditional Static Model For Single-leg Capacity allocation
In this section, we will introduce the static model for single-leg, which is the first
developed and applied in airline industry. The earliest single-leg capacity control
research is due to Littlewood(Littlewood,1972). Before RM model building,
Littlewood proposed six assumptions for their static model.
• The customer for different fare classes arrives in nonoverlapping periods in
the order of increasing fare classes.
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Figure 3.2: Dynamic solution booking process
• The demands for different fare classes are independent random variables.
• The demand for a given class will not be affected by the inventory control.
• The static models ignore some details about the control process in every
periods. for example, in practical, demand may not come in a order over
time and sometimes comes in a batch in a period.
• The static models do not concern the group booking request.
• The static models assume risk-neutrality.
Basing on those assumptions, some static solution methods are modelled.
Next we will introduce some static model. Firstly, we introduce the earliest
single leg capacity control model: Littlewood’s two-class model. The model has
two fare classes in a single leg flight. The total flight seats is S and the two
class’ fare is f1 > f2. The demand for class 1 is denoted D1 and its distribution
is denoted by "1(x). Pr(D1x) represents the probability of selling all protected
seats x to high fare class demand. f1Pr(D1x) is the marginal value , which
decides whether to accept low fare class or not. The model denotes x as the
remaining seats. The process is described in figure3.3. At first, a customer for
low fare class comes. If the marginal value with remaining seats x is lower than
the low fare class fare, the airline will accept the low fare class and receive the
revenues of f2. Otherwise, if the marginal value with remaining seats x is higher
than the low fare class fare, the airline will reject low fare class and close the
low fare class. After that, the airline only accept the high fare class.
Note that the expected value is related to remaining seats x and decreasing
in x . Hence, we can find a optimal remaining seats to simply the model. When
the remaining seats x is less than the optimal points, the airlines will reject the
low fare class. This optimal points is denoted as protection level, τ1. Therefore,
the protection level τ1 must satisfy the condition below:
f2 < f1Pr(D1τ1)and f2 f1Pr(D1τ1 + 1) (3.1)
This is called Littlewood’s rule. The advantages of Littlewood’s model is
simple and easy to implement. Airlines only need to use a demand distribution
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Figure 3.3: Littlewood’s model booking process
and then the capacity in different fare class can be calculated. However, the
disadvantages of Littlewood’s model is also obvious. In reality, customer will
not arrive in order of fare class. Therefore, Littlewood’s model is not in line
with the actual situation. As we mentioned before, the static model has several
assumptions. Most of assumptions make the model far from the reality. There-
fore, in the history of revenue management research, Scholars are constantly
relaxing these assumptions to get closer to reality.
The littlewood model is limited to a two-class model. On this basis, many
scholars have proposed multiple classes. The multi-level problem can be de-
scribed as the airlines divide the tickets into different prices to sell for different
customer groups. For example, as the figure 3.4 showing, the tickets from Shang-
hai to Frankfurt have several fare classes in the China Eastern Airline websites.
According to the examples, we can see that airlines sell the multiple fare classes
in the reality. Therefore, capacity allocation need to consider the multiple fare
classes problems.
Here we introduce multiple fare class model. The airlines sell one flight seat
in a increasing order fare classes. The fare class order can be noted as f1 >
f2 > ... > fn. The booking process in multiple fare class model is almost the
same as the two-class model. In the first period, the airline only opens the
lowest fare class and accepts lowest fare class (like fare fn)request. And in the
next period, the airline closes the above fare class fn and opens the fare class
fn−1, and so on, until the last period f1. It’s hard to solve this problem by two-
class model. Generally, the techniques for finding the optimal booking limits
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Figure 3.4: Fare class from Shanghai to Frankfurt
for three or more fare classes require the use of dynamic programming. As the
assumptions, the bellman function is :
ri(x) = E[ max
0≤ϕ≥min{di ,x}
{ fiϕ + ri−1(x −ϕ)}] (3.2)
With boundary conditions:
r0(x) = 0, x = 0,1, ...,C . (3.3)
C is the total capacity. ϕ is quantity of the customer which is accepted by
airlines in each fare class(optimal control seats). After solving the dynamic
programming, the model can get optimal booking limit in every fare class.
Although the dynamic programming model for finding the optimal booking
limits in the Multiple class model seems not mathematically difficult from to-
day’s view, at 1980s the airline choose some easy heuristics to solve n-class
model in their revenue management system. The most widely used heuristics is
the expected marginal seat revenue(EMSR) approaches which is developed by
Belobaba(1987).
The EMSR approaches estimates multi-class problems through a series of
Littlewood’s two-class models. The solution process is to calculate sum of pro-
tection level of current class relative to its higher by using Littlwood’s rule.
Here we illustrate a small example that use EMSR approach. A flight has three
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fare classes. If we want to know the protection level of class 3, first we need to
calculate the protection level for class 3 against class 1 by using equation (3.1):
τ31 = Pr
−1
1 (( f1 − f3)/ f1) (3.4)
and the protection level for class 3 agains class 2:
τ32 = Pr
−1
2 (( f2 − f3)/ f2) (3.5)
Therefore ,the protection level for class 3 is the sum of these two protection
levels, which is:
τ3 = τ31 +τ32 = Pr
−1
1 (( f1 − f3)/ f1) + Pr−12 (( f2 − f3)/ f2) (3.6)
According to the above example, the researcher proposed generalized model
as follow:
τ j =
j−1∑
i=1
Pr−i 1( fi − f j/ fi) (3.7)
According to the EMSR approach above, the airlines can easily deal with
the multiple class model. More precisely, the EMSR approach is same as the
Littlewood model when the flight only have two fare classes. However, the
EMSR model still does not break the limitations of the static model. Although
closer to reality than the littlewood model, the problem of multi-level models
was discussed.
3.1.2 Traditional dynamic Model for single-leg
This section will introduce the dynamic model for single-leg, which is relevant
to our DCAM model. The dynamic model for single leg can be found in Talluri
and van Ryzin(2006). Compared with the static model, the dynamic model no
longer assigns customers with different values to the specified time period. In
the dynamic model, customers with different values arrive randomly at each
time period. Due to the different arrival rates of customers with different values
in reality, the dynamic model usually gives different value customers an arrival
probability to simulate the airline ticketing process. The key contribution of DP
model is relaxing the low to high revenue order(low fare customer comes first and
then high fare customer comes) assumption. Other static model assumptions
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are retained as we mentioned in the section 3.1.1. The demand for different
fare classes are independent random variables. And the airlines are assumed as
risk-neutral.
The model assumptions and model formulation is described below:
rt(x) = E[ max
ω∈(0,1){Prod(t)ω+ rt+1(x −ω)}] (3.8)
With boundary conditions:
rT (x) = 0 ∀0≤ x ≤ N (3.9)
rt(0) = 0 ∀0≤ t ≤ T (3.10)
The DP model assumes that one single-leg has N seats. Prod(t) is the
revenue made in time t periods. If a customer for class j comes in time period
t, Prod(t) = p j, otherwise Prod(t) = 0. p j is the fare of class j. The remaining
capacity is denoted as x . The purpose of the model is to maximize the revenue
of a flight. The decision to make this revenue is controlled by binary variable
ω. When the customer is accepted by the airlines, ω= 1 and otherwise ω= 0.
As we mentioned before, DP model relaxed the simple Low-to-high order
assumptions. Additionally this makes the DP model closer to reality because in
the reality you can not imagine all demand arrives in your order, most of time
is disorderly. Because of the different policies of the static model, the dynamic
model needs new policies to solve the problem. As our DCAM model in section
3.2 has some relations with the DP model, next we will introduce the related
policies of the single-leg model.
3.1.3 Control policy for single leg
The control policies or control mechanisms are important in implementation
level of revenue management for airlines. Among them, there are three main
control strategies, namely booking limits, protection level and bid price.
Booking limits and Protection level
The control policy of booking limits is one of the basic and applicable control
mechanisms. Booking limits are defined that each class has a capacity limit
at a given point in time.(Defined in Talluri, 2006) Protection level is a similar
control for an amount of capacity to protect for each class in a flight. Protection
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level and booking limits are relative concepts. Protection level is to protect the
capacity of the high fare class. In contrast, booking limit is to limit the capacity
of the low fare class. Both of these two controls can be partitioned and nested.
According to the figure 3.5, we specify partitioned booking limits, partitioned
protection level, nested booking limits and nested protection level.
Figure 3.5: Partitioned and Nested booking limits and protection level
We use the flight data from eastern airline website (See figure 3.4) to explain
these four control policies. A partitioned booking limits distribute the available
capacity into determined class. Here, we denote bc as the booking limits of fare
class c, Which c ∈ 1,2,3. And we also denote τc as the protection level of
class c. When one class demand is over than its booking limit, this class will
be close. As the figure 3.5 showed, the airlines set a partitioned booking limit
of 100 seats for class 1, 80 seats for class 2 and 60 seats for class 3. When 100
seats are sold in class 1, the class 1 will be close. At this time, low revenues
class which are not sold out are still open. It can be seen from this point that
it is not reasonable by using partitioned booking limit. As the denotation of
protection level, we can see from the figure 3.5 that the protection level of each
class is the same as the booking limit in the partitioned control.
Compared the partitioned control policy, nested control policy seems more
reasonable. We use the same data to explain that. A nested booking limit
is demonstrated that the higher revenue class can access to the capacity of
lower revenue class after the capacity of the higher revenue class used up. For
example(See figure 3.5),with the total capacity of 240, the booking limit of high
revenue class(Class 1) is 240. That means that the customer for class 1 can buy
the seat until all seats are sold out. The booking limit of class 2 is 140. That
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means the customer for class 2 can buy any seat in class 2 and class 3 but the
airline has to reserve 100 seats for class 1. The booking limit of class 3 is 60
which means that the class 3 is closed after the capacity of class 3 is sold out.
As the denotation, the nested protection level is different from the nested
booking limit. As shown in figure 3.5, the protection level is equal to C − b j. C
is defined as total capacity and b j is defined as the booking limit of class j. For
example, the protection level of class 1 is 100. It means that the airline must
leave 100 seats for class 1 in a flight. Additionally, the airline will leave 180 for
class 1 and class 2. At this time , class 3 can not be sold. And the protection
level τ3 means that in this case all the class is opened for any customers.
Bid Price
The bid price control is simply to control the opening of the fare class through
the marginal price. We use the previous example to illustrate how to apply
bid price control. There are three fare classes that the fare is f1 = 16220,
f2 = 4030, f3 = 2540 respectively. The time period is T = 100. When time
t = 70, the marginal price is 5200 which is higher than f2 and lower than f1.
The demand request from class 2 and class 3 will be rejected and the demand
request from class 1 will be accepted. And When time period t = 30, the
marginal price is 3000 which is higher than f3 and lower than f2. The demand
request from class 3 will be rejected and the demand request from class 1 and
class 2 will be accepted. The bid price control and booking limits control are
different. The bid price control is dependent on the price and the booking limits
control is dependent on the fare-class. The bid price control is usually used in
dynamic programming capacity allocation model. In our model, we mainly use
bid price control.
3.1.4 Summary
In summary, after introducing the traditional single-leg capacity allocation
model, we know that the traditional model focused on the capacity alloca-
tion in different fare class for achieving the maximum revenues. Compared
with the static model, dynamic programming model is closed to the reality but
not easy to solve. Therefore, some study introduced bid price optimal control
to solve it. However, none of these capacity allocation model considered the
channel effect. In the next part, we will proposed our new DP model which
integrated channel effect into revenue management system. On the base of the
new model, we also propose optimal policy to solve it. And finally we design
some experiments to test the model and propose some implications for airline
company according to the results.
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3.2 Dynamic capacity allocation for airlines with multi-channel
distribution
3.2.1 Problem definition
The dynamic capacity allocation with multi-channel distribution can be de-
scribed as the following problem(DCAMP). Assume an airline company selling
N identical products(seats) for a single leg flight. Products are divided by n
fare classes and each fare class has its price p j, where j = {1, ...,n}. The prod-
ucts are sold by i = {0, ...,m} channels. Let channel 0 be the direct channel
and channel 1, ...,m as different indirect channels. There are t = 0, ..., T time
periods in a finite selling horizon. Each time period is small enough such that
maximum one customer will arrive in one period. Time starts from t = 0 and
ends at t = T . In each period, the customer arrives at i channel and require j
class with probability λi j. It holds that λ0 +
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1λi j = 1, where λ0 is
the probability that no customer arrives at that time period. When one seat
is sold by channel i, the airline pays δip j commission fee to channel i. At the
beginning of each period, when one demand arrives in one channel requiring
one fare class, the airline company firstly decides whether to accept the channel
request or not. This decision is denoted wi t coded to one if the airline company
accepts the channel request and 0 otherwise. Then, the airline company makes
the second decision about fare class request. The decision is again denoted by a
binary variable u j t . If u j t = 1, the airline company accepts this fare request and
0 otherwise. After the customer request has been accepted, the airline company
obtains a revenue (1 − δi)R j(t), or otherwise (1 − δi)R j(t) = 0 in case of no
arrival or request rejected. The decision depends on the remaining capacity x ,
each time period t, the channel revenues rate δi and the fare class p j, with the
objective to maximize the total expected revenues in a selling horizon from the
airline company’s perspective.
Now, we can present the main mathematical programming formulation with
the state variable remaining capacity x , the channel decision variable w, the
product decision variable u and the stage variable t to describe the airline
decision process. The model develops a dynamic airline seat booking capacity
allocation model in Lee and Hersh (1993), Lautenbacher and Stidham (1999),
and Liang (1999). Basing on their model, we integrate the channel factor into
airline dynamic seat booking capactiy allocation model and analyse the effect
in different situation. The premise of our model is to have the authority to limit
the capacity of each channel. Based on this premise, our model integrates the
capacity allocation for fare class and the capacity allocation for the channel into
a new dynamic model. We also discuss the optimal policy for the new model.
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3.2.2 Dynamic capacity allocation with a multi-channel model
We define the following parameters that will be used throughout the paper.
Parameters:
i: ∈ {0, ...,m} represents every channel in a single-leg flight.
j: ∈ {0, ...,n} represents the every fare class in a single-leg flight.
t: represents each time period.
T : finite horizon periods.
N : totally identical products in one leg flight
wi t : the channel decision binary indicator such that wi t = 1 if the airline com-
pany accepts channel i’s request in time period t, and 0 otherwise.
u j t : the fare class decision binary indicator such that u j t = 1 if the airline
company accepts fare class j request in time period t, and 0 otherwise.
δi: channel i’s commission fee rate.
R j(t): revenues made from fare class j in time period t.
x : the integer variable representing the number of products left (capacity).
Vt(x): the maximum expected revenues of the remaining capacity x in period
t.
Based on the parameters, the Bellman equation is then written as:
Vt(x) = E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi t(1−δt)u j tR j(t) + Vt+1(x −wi tu j t)}] (3.11)
With boundary conditions:
VT (x) = 0 ∀0≤ x ≤ N (3.12)
Vt(0) = 0 ∀0≤ t ≤ T (3.13)
Boundary condition (3.12) will be applied when the last period T comes,
and the airline company will make no decision after period T , regardless of the
remaining capacity. Boundary condition (3.13) will be applied regardless of the
time period. When the remaining capacity becomes 0, the expected revenues
will be 0.
3.2.3 Optimal control policy for DCAM
We optimize the model and find the optimal control policy. For analysing the
optimal control in this case, (3.11) can be rewritten as the following equation:
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Vt(x) = Vt+1(x) + E[maxwi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1){wi t(1−δt)u j tR j(t) + Vt+1(x − 1)− Vt+1(x)}]
= Vt+1(x) +
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1λi j(t)[((1−δi)p j + Vt+1(x − 1)− Vt+1(x))+] (3.14)
With the same boundary conditions.
We define ∆Vt+1(x) = Vt+1(x)− Vt+1(x − 1) as the expected marginal value
(EMV) of the capacity at time period t, which is the expected increasing value
of the x th unit of the capacity. The optimal control policy is based on EMV.
When EMV is lower than the revenues from channel i in fare class j (we assume
that the revenue is only related with fare price p j and the commission rate δi,
which is (1− δi)R j(t) = (1− δi)p j), the airline company accepts the request,
and otherwise, it rejects it. The EMV is calculated by function (3.14) and is
related to state variable x and time period t. Therefore, the optimal condition
for accepting channel i in class j can be described as (1−δi)p j ≥∆Vt+1(x) =
Vt+1(x)−Vt+1(x−1). The optimal control can use the bid price where we define
the bid price as the following equation.
pit(x) =∆Vt(x) (3.15)
When revenues exceed the bid price, the seat request is accepted and other-
wise is rejected. Based on the definition of value function (3.11), Vt(x) and the
definition of EMV ∆Vt+1(x), we can obviously obtain the following important
properties:
Lemma 1 For t = 0,1, ..., T , Vt(x) is concave and non-increasing in x =
0,1, ...,N .
Lemma 2 The expected value of capacity ∆Vt(x) is non-increasing with state
variable x and time period t.
∆Vt(x + 1) ≤∆Vt(x)
∆Vt+1(x) ≤∆Vt(x) ∀0≤ x ≤ N ,∀0≤ t ≤ T (3.16)
Proof of Lemma (2): we first introduce a concave function definition and a
lemma proven by Stidham (1978).
Definition 1 A function g: Z+ → R is concave if and only if g(s)− g(s + 1) is
non-increasing in s.
Lemma 3 Suppose f : Z+→ R is concave. Let g : Z+→ R be defined by
g(x) = max
b=0,1,...,n
{bp+ f (x − b)}
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Then, for any p ≥ 0 and non-negative integer n, g(x) is concave in x ≥ 0.
The proof of Lemma (1) is based on (3), and we prove it by induction on
t. VT (x) = 0 for all x . Therefore, VT (x) = 0 is trivially concave and non-
increasing. Assume that Vt+1(x) is concave and non-increasing, and let g(x) =
max{δip j + Vt+1(x),Vt+1(x − 1)}. Then,
Vt(x) = Vt+1(x) +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λi j(t)g(x)
According to Lemma (3), g(x) can be easily proven to be concave.
Because
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1λi j(t) can be regarded as a non-negative constant,∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1λi j(t)g(x) is also concave. Vt+1(x) is concave as we have as-
sumed. Thus, based on the principle that the sum of two concave (non-
increasing)functions is also a concave function, we can prove that Vt(x) is also
a concave and non-increasing with respect to x .
Proof of Lemma (2): because the value function Vt(x) is concave, the incre-
ments ∆Vt(x) are non-increasing in x .
To prove the monotonicity of ∆Vt(x) in t, we have:
∆Vt(x) = Vt(x)− Vt(x − 1)
= Vt+1(x) + E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi tδiu j tR j(t)−∆Vt+1(x)}]
−{Vt+1(x − 1) + E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi tδiu j tR j(t)−∆Vt+1(x − 1)}]
=∆Vt+1(x) + E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi tδiu j tR j(t)−∆Vt+1(x)}
− max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi tδiu j tR j(t)−∆Vt+1(x − 1)}]
Because of ∆Vt(x)≤∆Vt(x − 1) as just proven,
E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi tδiu j tR j(t)−∆Vt+1(x)}]≥
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E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1)
{wi tδiu j tR j(t)−∆Vt+1(x − 1)}]
This is therefore larger than or equal to ∆Vt(x).
These two Lemmas demonstrate the monotonicity of ∆Vt(x) with respect to
time period t and capacity x . The monotonicity ∆Vt(x) implies that for one
deterministic time period t, for each channel i and each fare class j, there exists
a critical capacity point xˆ i j(t) that a request for a seat in channel i and fare j
is denied for the remaining capacities x < xˆ i j(t) and accepted for x ≥ xˆ i j(t).
With the remaining capacity x given, for each channel i and each fare class j,
there also exists a critical time period point tˆ i j(x) that a demand for a seat
in channel i and fare class j is denied for t < tˆ i j and accepted for t ≥ tˆ i j(x).
Obviously, from the above two implications, we can imply that for a time period
t, remaining capacity x and a determined class j, there exists a set of channel
iˆ j(t, x) that the demand for a seat in channel i and fare class j is denied for
i j > iˆ j(t, x) and accepted for i j ≤ iˆ j(t, x).
These implications show how the airline makes the decision (deny/accept)
with the information of the time period, remaining capacity, class and channel
by using our optimal policy when demand comes. Therefore, the optimal policy
developed here provides theoretical support in the following sections (4) for
analysing the channel-shift customer behaviours.
3.3 Numerical experiment and analysis
3.3.1 Design of experiments
In this section, we design several experiments for examining our model in dif-
ferent situations. Our model describes the integration of channel choice and
fare choice and the relationship between the channel distribution system and
revenue management system. Thus, there will be a number of problems to be
investigated. We have illustrated some representative examples Table 3.1 to
demonstrate the characteristics of our model and the outcomes when decisions
are integrated.
Experiment 1 examines the relationship between the commission fee and air-
line company revenues in multichannel and single-fare classes. Customer shift
behaviour is not considered in this experiment. Experiment 2 examines the
change of airline company revenues with different numbers of channels in one
fare class. We assume that there is one demand pattern, one determined com-
mission fee and no customer shift behaviour. Experiment 3 discovers the differ-
ences between the classic revenue dynamic model and our multichannel model
in the multi-fare system. We assume that each channel has the same market
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Table 3.1: Experiment list
Experiments No.of Channels No.of Fare Classes Demand pattern Commission Fee Case
1 2 1 1 3
2 2& 3 1 1 1
3 1& 2 2 1 1
4 2 1 3 1
share and that each fare class has the same arrival rate. In addition, these ex-
periments have the same length of time. The fare and the channel commission
rates are all the same. Experiment 4 investigates how our multichannel system
behaves when facing different demand patterns (i.e., with high and low demand
volumes). Among these experiments, we include the classic single-leg dynamic
programming model (DP in section 3.1.2, classic system, see Lee and Hersh,
1993) as the benchmark for comparison purposes. More specifically, the DP
model is an independent fare class capacity allocation model, and the channel
part in the reality will depend on the rule of first come, first serve.
3.3.2 The effect of commission fee on airlines revenue
In the first experiment, we discuss the effects of commission rates on airline
revenues and channel allocation by implementing our policy. We proposed the
following examples as in Table 3.2 for running our numerical experiment. An
airline has two channels: Channel A is indirect (like GDS) and Channel D is
direct (like airline websites). These two channels differ in terms of their market
shares (in our model, market share can also be replaced by arrival rates) and
commission rates. For explicitly describing the result of channel allocation, the
example only has one fare class.
Table 3.2: Channel Characteristics for Experiment 1
Channel Market Share Fare Class(Fare) Commission Rate
A(CH.A) 74% 1 class(260) 13%,23%,33%
D(CH.D) 26% 1 class(260) 0%,0%,0%
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The experiment flight leg has 50 capacities, and the time period for selling is
T=100. Through 1,000 runs of the simulator for different commission rates, the
experiments have different maximum revenues that are averaged over 1,000 runs,
and the results are shown in Table 3.3. In this experiment, we compare the total
revenues using the DP model and the DCAM model, the customer proportions
in channel A and channel D, and the increasing percentage of revenues from the
DP model to the DCAM model. As illustrated in Table 3.3, the DCAM model
system makes more revenues than the classic system through reallocating the
capacity using the fare class and channel. Even at the low commission rate of
0.13, the DCAM improves revenues by 3.99% compared to the DP model.
Moreover, we analyse the sources of the improvements and the sales be-
haviours in the time periods. From the results of allocating seats in CH.A and
CH.D (Table 3.3), the seat sold by CH.D has improved by 53.76% compared
to the original 74%(See Table 3.2), and the seat sold by CH.A has decreased
to 46.24%. More seats allocated to CH.D (direct channel/low cost channel)
improve airline revenues. However, according to Figure 3.6, CH.A is not useless
in all time periods. At the beginning, CH.A sells more seats than the CH.D
because of the high volume of demand, and then our optimal policy limits CH.A
and relaxes the restriction to CH.D. The policy lets CH.D receive more seats
than CH.A in the middle range of selling periods. In the latter periods, CH.A
meets much more demand than the CH.D and increases the volume of sales. In
general, our model does not simply restrict the allocation of seats to CH.A and
shift the seats to CH.D, but rather, it compromises the demand volume, channel
costs and the time of demand to reallocate the seats for CH.A and CH.D.
Table 3.3: Results of Experiment 3.3.2
Commission rate Revenues for DP Revenues for DCAM Seat allocation in CH.A Seat allocation in CH.D Inc.rate
0.13 11749.4 12218.5 46.24% 53.76% 3.99%
0.23 10787.4 11647.3 45.24% 54.76% 7.97%
0.33 9825.4 11052.3 47.47% 52.04% 12.48%
If we consider the effect of commission rate, the total revenues will decrease
with the increasing commission rate, either by the DP model or the DCAM
model. However, in this case, with the comparison of the DP and DCAM
models, revenues will decrease more slowly in DCAM (Figure 3.7).
Thus, this experiment concludes the following:
• The DCAM model improves revenues over different commission rates com-
pared with the DP model.
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Figure 3.6: Sales Behaviours in Experiment 3.3.2
• The DCAM model does not simply limit the indirect channel and increase
the seats in the direct channel, but rather, it compromises the demand
volume, channel costs and time of demand to dynamically reallocate the
seats for all channels.
• The DCAM model can reduce the lost revenues due to increased commis-
sion fees compared to the DP model.
3.3.3 The effect of channel amount
In the second experiment, we discuss whether the number of channel affects the
revenues by using the DCAM model or not. The experiment adopts the double
channel example and the triple channel example with one fare class (p=260).
The selling horizon is divided into T=100 time periods, and the total capacity
is 50. The double channel example has two channels: Channel A (as Agency)
has an 82% market share with a 19% commission rate, and Channel D (as
airlines website) has an 18% market share with a 0% commission rate. For the
triple channel case, we consider two situations. Firstly, we add one additional
low commission rate channel (Low CR), and then we add one additional high
commission rate channel (High CR). This consideration can fully verify the effect
with the consideration of the number of channels. We assume that Channel A
and Channel B are different travel agencies with different arrival rates and
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Figure 3.7: Revenue Changes over Different Commission Rates
different commission rates. The experiment is simulated 1,000 times, and we
assess the average results.
Table 3.4: Results of Experiment 3.3.3
Double Channel Triple Channel(Low CR) Triple Channel(High CR)
CH.A CH.D CH.A CH.B CH.D CH.A CH.B CH.D
Arrival Rate 0.82 0.18 0.51 0.31 0.18 0.51 0.31 0.18
Commission rate 19% 0% 19% 9% 0% 29% 19% 0%
Seat allocation 62.55% 37.45% 6.54% 58.93 % 34.53% 6.81% 59.46% 33.73%
Rev.DP 10974.6 11377.6 10311.6
Rev.DCAM 11455.3 12149.8 11282.1
Inc.rate 4.37% 6.78% 9.41%
As illustrated in Table 3.4, the DCAM system improves revenues in both the
double channel distribution system, and the triple channel system compared
to classic system. More precisely, the triple channel with the low CR added
improves revenues by 6.78% compared to the DP model, and the improvement
is also higher than double channel. Compared with the absolute revenues of the
double channel, the triple channel with the low CP is an improvement, whereas
the triple channel with the high CR has lower revenues than the double channel.
Nevertheless, the improvement from the DP to the DCAM is the highest in the
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case of the triple channel with the high CR. Where do the improvements come
from? Additionally, why does this happen? We plot the sales behaviours for
the full periods for the explanation (Figure 3.8) of the case of the triple channel
with the high CR. From the analysis of sales behaviours, at the beginning and
middle stages of the sales period, almost all seats are sold by Channel B and
Channel D. In the latter periods, Channel A sells more seats because Channel
B and Channel D have already fulfilled their demand. Therefore, regardless of
adding one low CR channel or one high CR channel, the increasing rate between
the DP and the DCAM improves because the airlines receive more requests from
relatively low CR channels and rejects more requests from relatively high CR
channels, although it has a high arrival probability. On the other hand, in
the DP model, airlines receive requests only by first come first serve principle,
which means that it only depends on arrival probability. In conclusion, the
DCAM model can efficiently allocate the capacity in the multi-channel system
(regardless of adding the high CR channel or the low CR channel) to maximize
the airline’s revenues.
Figure 3.8: Sales Behaviour in Experiment 3.3.3
3.3.4 Dynamic channel distribution with two fare classes and double
channels
Experiment 3 examines the efficiency of the DCAM model in the multi-fare
system. We assume that a single-leg flight has two different classes of cus-
tomers with fare prices {p1, p2} = {260,200} and arrival rates with probabil-
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ities {λ1,λ2} = {0.24,0.75} . The airline sells these tickets in two channels
with the commission fee rates {δ1,δ2} = {0.13,0} and customer arrival rates
in channels with probabilities {λa,λb} = {0.74,0.26}. The selling horizon is
also divided into T = 100 periods, and the total capacity is 50. As Table 3.5
illustrates, the DCAM model can reallocate the capacity to customers both in
the fare classes and channels, which does not follow the first come, first serve
order. The DP model can only reallocate the fare classes, and the channel al-
location applies first come, first serve order. Therefore, the experiment results
demonstrate that the DCAM model improves revenues by 3.15% compared to
the DP model.
Table 3.5: Results of Experiment 3.3.4
Channel A Channel D Fare class 1 Fare class 2
Arrival Rate 0.74 0.26 0.24 0.75
Commission rate 13% 0% Price 260 200
Seat allocation by DCAM 53.12% 46.88% 68.05 % 31.95%
Seat allocation by DP 74% 26% 68.79% 31.21%
Rev.DP 10903.2
Rev.DCAM 11247.4
Inc.rate 3.15%
For more precise analysis, we adopt one experiment for our DCAM system
and observe the sales behaviours in all time periods (Figure 3.9). We supposed
that aircraft seats are sold in 4 situations, including the high commission fee
channel with the high fare class (CHAF1), the high commission fee channel
with the low fare class (CHAF2), the low commission fee channel with the low
high fare class (CHDF2) and the low commission fee channel with the high fare
class (CHDF1). From Figure 3.9, we have the obvious result that CHAF1 is
the best seller among these four situations. However, CHAF1 does not have
the highest volume (the highest volume belongs to CHAF2, which means that
CHAF2 has a high arrival rate) and does not have the highest net revenue per
seat sold (the highest value is CHDF1). Thus, the result of our optimal choice
has relationships with the airlines’ revenues and the customer volume of each
channel and fare. This also explains why at the end of periods, the high-volume
situation CHAF2 sells more seats, as seen in Figure 3.10.
When we compare the DCAM system with multi-fare and the DCAM system
without multi-fares, we find some differences. The increasing rate of the DCAM
with multi-fares is lower (3.15% vs. 3.99%). By observing the sales behaviours
in Figure 3.10, we see that such a reduction of improvement in our experiment
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Figure 3.9: Sales Behaviours Shown by Fares in Channels
could be due to the assumption of having a maximum one customer in one period
(i.e., when the customer is rejected in the period, demand is lost). For example,
when a customer is rejected by the high fare class with a high commission fee
channel, this high fare demand is lost, and in the next period, the seat probably
is sold by the low fare class with a low commission fee channel. Hence, the
whole system will lose the opportunity of revenue improvement compared with
the multi-channel system. In conclusion, the integration of the multi-channel
and multi-fare system still has a good performance in our experiment.
3.3.5 Channel allocation with different demand patterns
Experiment 4 compares the performances of the classic system and the DCAM
system over different selling horizons and with different capacities. In the ex-
ample, we assume that the customer arrival rate for each time is 0.99, which
represents that there is a 99% possibility that one customer will come in each
time period. Thus, the time period can be roughly viewed as the value of to-
tal demand. This experiment adopts the basic parameters of experiment 3.3.2
(Table 3.2). The total capacity for each example is 50, and the time period is
30,100,300, which represents the low demand, middle demand and high demand
volumes, respectively.
Table (3.6) illustrates that for the low demand case, there are less revenue
differences between the DP and DCAM models. The result confirms the real-
ity in air tickets sales. When the airline does not have sufficient customers, it
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Figure 3.10: Sales Behaviours for Channels and Fares Separately
Table 3.6: Results of Experiment 3.3.5
Time Capacity Revenues for DP Revenues for DCAM Seat allocation of CH.A Seat allocation of CH.D Inc.rate
30 50 7049.64 7033 0.5004 0.0996 -0.23%
100 50 11749.4 12218.5 0.4624 0.5376 3.99%
200 50 11749.4 12958.3 0.0244 0.9756 10.64%
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attempts to sell every ticket to every coming customer to increase its revenues.
This sales behaviour can also be shown in Figure 3.11. Therefore, when low
demand happens, the optimal channel allocation for the DCAM completely de-
pends on the arrival rate of each channel. The second case presents that normal
demand volume provides more revenue improvements by using the DCAM sys-
tem rather than by using the classic system. The customer proportion of each
channel will be reallocated by the DCAM model.
Figure 3.11: Low Demand Pattern Sales Behaviours
Figure 3.12 demonstrates how the DCAM system controls the capacity to
improve the revenues. As mentioned in the above experiments, in the beginning
periods, the system sells more seats through channel D, and at the end of
periods, the system sells more seats through Channel A because of its high
arrival rate.
When the extremely high demand occurs (Figure 3.13), the channel control
system will choose all the low commission fee channels such as the direct channel
(CH.D), and the DCAM model makes the highest revenue improvements. These
three cases imply that demand forecasting for the DCAM system is important
and will influence the revenue improvements.
3.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have studied the problem of capacity control in the single-
leg flight fare class and multi-channel distribution. We proposed a dynamic
programming model for integrating the fare class capacity allocation and the
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Figure 3.12: Middle Demand Pattern Sales Behaviours
Figure 3.13: High Demand Pattern Sales Behaviours
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channel capacity deployment. After that, we have explored the optimal policy
for the integrated model to maximum the airlines revenues and proposed sev-
eral properties corresponding to the optimal policy. Furthermore, we proposed
a customer shift behaviour model on the basis of the integrated model and dis-
covered the optimal policy for that. The numerical experiments illustrate the
different applications of the model and provide several implications for airline
companies. Firstly, our system can keep the revenues more stable when channel
commission rates increase. This implication decreases the lost revenue risk by
contracting with the channel and holding the dominant position in airline mar-
ket. Secondly, multiple indirect sales channels will not reduce airline company
revenues, and, conversely, more indirect channels might bring more profits for
the airline company. Therefore, the airlines should introduce more channels to
improve their revenues. Thirdly, the demand forecast dominates a significant
position in our system. The accurate prediction of demand improves the rev-
enues for the airline company. After that, our system integrates the channel and
fare class, and there is not an obvious conflict between the channel and fare class
allocation. The airline company can realize channel control on the basis of the
revenue system. However, we need to note the observation that the increased
rate of the DCAM with multi-fare and without multi-fare brings a small differ-
ence. This might be due to the combined but complex effects of the fare class
and the channel distribution. As discussed in Section 5.4, the assumption of cus-
tomer arrival is one explanation for the result. A more thorough investigation is
needed in a future study. Thus, our study solves a mathematical problem, and
it has value for practical use. Finally, all applications we proposed have better
performance in dealing with the problem of multi-fare and multi-channel capac-
ity control than the classic independent system. The key contribution of this
study is that it is the first attempt to integrate the capacity allocation decision
and distribution channel decision in order to improve the revenue management.
The modelling framework provides a basis for investigating relevant issues in fu-
ture studies. The optimal policy together with the observations from numerical
examples brings insights on the directions where revenues can be improved in
practice. Thus, from both the theoretical and practical perspectives, this study
contributes to the knowledge development in the field.
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4 DCAM Model with Channel-shift Customer Behaviour
While the chapter 3 deal with single-leg capacity allocation and channel dis-
tribution problem. In the DCAM model, we assumed that demand for each
channel is independent. More specifically, when the airline makes a decision
of one channel, they do not consider the other available channel. From the
customer side, the control model assumes that if the request is rejected by one
channel, the demand will lost. However, this hypothesis is somewhat inconsis-
tent with reality. For example, When a customer is rejected by a low value
channel, He has a great possibility to buy the ticket from a high value channel
and it is called channel-shift customer behaviour. When the customer choose
another flight, it is called lost sales. Obviously, this kind of customer behaviour
often occurs in reality and needs to be considered in the control model.
4.1 Traditional capacity allocation model with customer behaviour
In the traditional capacity control model, similar behaviours of customers are
also considered. In traditional model, it is called buy-up model. The buy
up model relaxed one of the six assumptions we introduced in the previous
section(See section 3.1.1), which is that the demand is independent for each
fare class. The model considered that the customers would buy a higher fare
class when they rejected by a low fare class. Of course, this kind of customer
behaviour can also occur, but it is less likely to occur than the channel-shift
customer behaviour. Needles to say, for a customer, if he buys a ticket at a
higher fare class, he will increase their ticketing cost, but to buy from high value
channel will not increase his cost. Therefore, it is more practical to consider
channel-shift customer behaviour.
Next we will first introduce some traditional buy-up models in section 4.1.1
and 4.1.2. After that, we will define our channel-shift problem in section 4.2 and
propose our model in section 4.3. Finally, we use some experiments to verify
the channel-shift model in section 4.4.
4.1.1 Traditional Static buy-up model
In the previous research on the buy up model, the first step was to
start with the traditional static revenue management model(See Belob-
aba(1987a,b,1989),Belobaba and Weatherford(1996),Weatherford et.al(1993),
Bohutinsky(1990). For example, two class buy-up model is discussed based
on the Littlewood’s model we have introduced in section 3.1.1. To discuss the
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two class buy-up model, we review the Littlewood model here. When the cus-
tomer for fare class 2 comes, he will be accepted only if the class 2 fare is
greater than the marginal price, which is f2 ≥ f1Pr(D1 ≥ x) (See equation
(3.1)). Additionally when the class 2 fare is lower than the marginal price,
which is f2 ≤ f1Pr(D1 ≥ x), the customer will be rejected. However, to the
buy-up model, it has a probability q that the customer will buy class 1 instead
of class 2. The optimal formulation is below:
f2 − f1Pr(D1 ≥ x)≥ q( f1 − f1Pr(D1 ≥ x)) (4.1)
or equivalently
f2 ≥ (1− q) f1Pr(D1 ≥ x) + q f1 (4.2)
Note that If the customer buy up to class 1, the net benefit for airline is
f1 − f1Pr(D1 ≥ x). The left side is the net revenue for airline if the airline
accept the customer for class 2, which is the Littlewood’s rule. The optimal
balance is whether to open class 2 or close class 2 and let the customer have
probability q to buy up to class 1. If the net benefit for airline in class 2 is
higher than the expected net revenue for airline up to class 1, the airline will
still open class 2, otherwise close the class 2. The process is shown in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Static two-class buy up model booking process
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The development of the buy-up model relies on the development of traditional
revenue management models. Like the traditional two-class model, the two-
class buy-up model can not solve the multi-class buy up problem in reality. For
example, when one class is closed, the decision can not only depend on the
upper class or the lower class. The buy up behaviour is also complex. Some one
may buy two higher class or three higher class. Therefore, the multi-class model
is not a simple binary model and become a complex multi-nominal model.
We have mentioned a heuristic method EMSR in traditional static single-leg,
which dealing with the multi-class model(See section 3.1.1). Through introduc-
ing the buy up factor into EMSR heuristic model, the researcher try to solve
the multi-class buy up problem. The equation is below:
τ j =
j−1∑
i=1
Pr−1i (qi fi − f j/(1− qi) fi) (4.3)
Where qi is the probability that the customer of class j buys up to class i,
i ∈ 1, ..., j − 1. fi is the fare of class i and τ j is the protection level of class
j. Pri is the demand distribution of class i. The EMSR buy up model (4.3) is
developed from the original EMSR model (3.7).
Though the static buy up model has proved useful in practice(Bohutinsky,1990),
it is undeniable that the model still has certain flaws as the traditional static
model. The most of typical of these is the customer arrival order. In the next
section, we will introduce the buy-up factor in dynamic model.
4.1.2 Traditional dynamic buy-up model
Dynamic fare-class buy-up Model was developed by You(2001). This model
extended the static model, which we have mentioned above, to a dynamic multi-
class model. The difference between dynamic model and static model will not
be discussed again here(See Chapter 3). Here we introduce the dynamic buy-up
Model.
As the traditional dynamic model in section 3.1.2, the objection of the value
function is to maximize the expected revenue in a determined selling period.
However, the dynamic buy-up model has one more decision compared with the
traditional DP model. For example, to traditional DP model, it is assumed
that when one demand comes, the airline has to decide whether to accept it
or not. If the customer is rejected, this demand is lost. But to buy-up model,
after the customer is rejected, the model assumed that the customer has some
probability to buy up to a higher class. At this time, the airline should make
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another accept/deny decision for the return customer. The buy-up DP model
is illustrated below:
vt(x) = vt−1(x) +
n∑
i=1
λit max{g it(x , c), r i −∆vt−1(x)} (4.4)
Where
g it(x , c) =
∑
l∈c
qil(rl −∆vt−1(x)), i ≥ 2 (4.5)
Compared with the DP model, the decision of the buy-up model(equation 4.4)
not only depends on the net revenue of the class i, which is r i −∆vt−1(x), but
also considers the expected net revenue of buy-up class l, which is the equation
(4.5).
According to the development of the buy-up model, this model provides two
important contributions to the study of the buy-up model. The first one is for
the traditional DP model, which breaks an assumption that when a customer is
rejected, the demand will be lost. The second one is for the static buy-up model,
which releases an assumption of the strict low-high class order . Relaxing these
two assumptions makes the buy-up model closer to the reality. The model of
this paper is based on the inspiration of this model and is combined with the
multi-channel model.
4.1.3 Summary
The buy-up-related models, whether static, heuristic, or dynamic, provide a
solution that responds to customer choice behaviour. At the academic level,
some experiments with these models have demonstrated that the buy up model
has increased the revenue of airlines. At the same time, there can be some
analysis and feedback on the customer’s behaviour. Of course, the model itself
also has some limitations and assumptions that require more researchers to
release it to get closer to reality. In addition to the limitations of the model
itself and some assumptions, the buy up model still has some difficulties at
the implementation level. For example, how to estimate the buy-up factor
is very difficult for airlines. In the model we mentioned above, they always
simply assume a reasonable-sounding factor. However, sometimes there are
some degrees of deviation from the actual situation. In addition, the buy up
model easily duplicates customer demand forecasts. This will also have a certain
influence on the capacity control. Despite some deficiencies, the buy-up model
proved to be effective in practice.
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As we mentioned above, customer choice behaviour has a certain influence
on capacity control. Due to the development of the Internet, in most cases,
customers no longer face the airline directly, but face various channels. The
customer choice behaviour in the face of the channel also has a great influence
on the airline’s channel strategy. In the next section we will propose solutions
to the customer’s choice of behaviour in the channel.
4.2 Problem definition
In this section, we analyse the customer channel shift behaviour and present
a customer channel shift DCAMP model (DCAMS). We define customer shift
behaviour as: when a customer is rejected by a high-cost channel, the customer
has a probability to shift to a low-cost channel(Figure 4.2). As mentioned in
Section 3.2.3, when demand occurs, there exists a set of channels which are
capable of fulfilling the demand, i.e. with only i j ≤ iˆ j(t, x). Channel shift
customer behaviour will more likely happen in reality than the fare buy-up
behaviour (You, 2001,see section 4.1.2), because shift behaviour will not add
more cost for customers. Therefore, channel shift behaviour will affect on the
decision of channel capacity allocation.
Figure 4.2: Channel Shift Decision Process
We formulate the DCAMSmodel basing on the DCAMmodel assumption (see
Chapter 3). So there are some assumptions that are the same as the DCAM
model. For example, we assumed that at most one customer arrives in each
period. The arrival rate of each fare class j and channel i is λi j. It holds that
λ0+
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1λi j = 1, where λ0 is the probability that no booking requests in
that period. In addition to the original customer-based assumptions, we extend
some assumptions about the channel-shift behaviour. We assume that if a
customer is rejected by channel i in time period t, then the customer determines
to buy the tickets through channel l at the same period with a probability σl t .
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General conditions imposed on σl t are σl t ≥ 0 and σ0t +∑ml=iσl t = 1 where
σ0t ≥ 0 denotes the probability of having no further booking requests for the
denied booking of channel j at time t. If the customer is rejected for the second
time, we assume that the customer is completely lost. We also define that the
commission fee rate δi can be nested by δ0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2... ≤ δm−1 ≤ δm, where
i ≤ l ∈ {0, ...,m}. The condition denotes that the customer can only shift to
low-cost channel.
The first assumption is a standard assumption for the DCAM model in chap-
ter 3. The second and third assumption describe the possibility of channel-shift
customer behaviour. Therefore, our channel-shift model make an improvements
on the traditional RM models and multi-channel RM model which do not con-
sider the channel-shift behaviour.
To the DCAMS problem, the airline has to make three decisions at each time
period t:
1. Accept or reject a booking request from Channel i(D1).
2. Accept or reject a booking request for fare class j(D2).
3. In the case of rejection in D1 and if the customer wants to shift to channel
l, accept or reject the customer’s new booking request(D3).
As DCAMS system has three decisions for channel allocation, we introduce
the binary channel variables wi t, the binary fare-class variables u j t and another
binary channel-shift variable ηl t to represent decisions D1, D2 and D3 for any
time period t, channel i, fare-class j, and shift channel l. In particular, u j t = 1,
wi t = 1 if and only if a booking request for fare class j from channel i is
accepted. When u j t = 1,wi t = 0,ηl t = 1 if and only if an upgrade to channel l
from i is accepted, Which represents that if the channel i rejected customer is
accepted by channel l at the time period t, ηl t equals to 1; otherwise 0.
The DCAMS problem can be formulated as a dynamic programming model.
The model is formulates as the following section.
4.3 Channel-shift Model
Parameters:
i: ∈ {0, ...,m} represents every channel in a single-leg flight.
j: ∈ {0, ...,n} represents the every fare class in a single-leg flight.
t: represents each time period.
T : finite horizon periods.
N : totally identical products in one leg flight
wi t : the channel decision binary indicator such that wi t = 1 if the airline com-
pany accepts channel i’s request in time period t, and 0 otherwise.
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u j t : the fare class decision binary indicator such that u j t = 1 if the airline
company accepts fare class j request in time period t, and 0 otherwise.
δi: channel i’s commission fee rate.
R j(t): revenues made from fare class j in time period t.
x : the integer variable representing the number of products left (capacity).
Vt(x): the maximum expected revenues of the remaining capacity x in period
t.
Additional Parameters:
ηl t: the channel binary indicator such that ηl t = 1 if the channel i rejected
customer is accepted by channel l at the time period t, otherwise 0.
σl t : the probability representing the customer buy the tickets through channel
l in the period t after the customer rejected by channel i.
The DCAMS model can be formulated as follows:
Vt(x) =E[ max
wi t∈(0,1),u j t∈(0,1),ηl t∈(0,1)
{wi t(1−δi)u j tR(t) + Vt+1(x −wi tu j t)+
(1−wi t)[ηl t(1−δl)u j tR(t) + Vt+1(x −ηl tu j t)]}]
(4.6)
where the constrains for the DCAMS model is :
wi t +ηl t ≤ 1,wi t ∈ {0,1},ηl t ∈ {0,1}
This constrain limits that at one period only one customer can come, and only
when this customer are rejected by the i channel, there will be some probability
that the customer can ask for l channel.
where there are also two boundary conditions as the DCAM model (3.11):
VT (x) = 0,∀0≤ x ≤ N (4.7)
Vt(0) = 0,∀0≤ t ≤ T (4.8)
The same as the DCAM boundary condition, the boundary condition 4.7
represents that no matter how many capacity left, the expected value will be
zero at the end of time periods. Additionally, the boundary condition (4.8) sets
the capacity boundary, which means that when all capacity are sold out, the
expected value will also be zero.
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For computing and analysing, the model (4.6) can be written as the following
equation:
Vt(x) = Vt+1(x) +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λi j(t)max{(1−δi)p j −∆Vi t(x),
m∑
l=i
σl t max[(1−δl)p j −∆Vl t(x), 0], 0}
(4.9)
The optimal policy for DCAMS model is also based on the DCAM model.
We also use bid price policy to optimize the model.
The optimal policy for DCAMS model can be simplicity explained as follows.
First, we define ∆Wi t =
∑m
l=iσl t max[(1 − δl)p j − ∆Vl t(x), 0]. Therefore,
∆W i t is a non-negative variable and represents the net revenue after rejecting
the first choice channel i. That implies that when the rejected customer is
accepted, the revenue of fare class j from channel l must larger than the bid
price of channel l, where (1 − δl)p j ≥ ∆Vl t(x). The policy of deciding the
first channel choice is also related to the ∆Wi t . If the first booking request is
accepted, the net revenue of accepting the request must be larger than the net
revenue of rejecting it, where (1−δi)p j −∆Vi t(x)≥∆Wi t(x).
Compared the DCAM model or the traditional DP model, the revenue of the
fare class j from channel j, where (1 − δi)p j, is not only larger than the bid
price, but it should larger than bid price minus the net revenue of rejecting the
first request ∆Vi t(x) +∆Wi t . Therefore, there will be a new bid price for the
customer shift model:
pi(x) =∆Vi t(x) +∆Wi t
We point out that the DCAMS (4.6) reduces to that presented in You(2001)
in a single-leg setting without channel factor(See section 4.1.2).And also the
DCAMS model reduces to the DCAM formulation without channel-shift factor
presented in Chapter 3.
4.4 Numerical experiments
4.4.1 Design of experiments
In this section, we design several experiments for demonstrating the properties
of the channel customer shift model. Hence, there will be amount of problems
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Table 4.1: Experiment list
Experiments No.of Channels Demand pattern Commission Fee Case Shift rate case
1 2 1 1 3
2 2 1 4 1
3 2 3 1 1
to be investigated. We have illustrated some representative examples (Table
4.1) to demonstrate the characteristics of our model and the outcomes when
decisions are integrated.
The first experiment was used to test the impact of our model on the revenue
system in the three customer transfer rates. Among these, we set the same
demand and the same agency rates for the two channels.In the second experi-
ment, we considered the impact of different agency fees on the customer transfer
behaviour model. Here we set the same shift rate, the same demand and four
commission fee rate for the two channels. In the third experiment, we verified
the application of the model under different requirements. We set the same
commission fee rate, the same shift rate and three different demand patterns
for two channels.
4.4.2 Channel-shift in different shift rate
The first experiment presents the effect of customer shift behaviour on channel
allocation based on the model DCAMS and testify the effect of shift rate on air-
line’s revenue by implementing our policy. In order to more accurately represent
the impact of shift rate on the revenue system, we use the most basic channel
model. There are two channels and one fare class. The specific parameters can
be seen in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Channel Characteristics for Experiment 4.4.2
Capacity 50 Time periods 100
Channel Market Share Fare Class(Fare) Commission Rate
A(CH.A) 74% 1 class(260) 13%
D(CH.D) 26% 1 class(260) 0%
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In this experiment, the flight leg has 50 capacities and the time period for
selling is T = 100. Through 1000 runs of the simulator for different shift rates,
the results are shown in Table 4.3. The experiment compares the revenues
of DP model, DCAM model and DCAMS model, the seat allocation into dif-
ferent channel(Channel A and Channel D) and the increase rate in different
shift rates. Table 4.3 illustrates that with the increase of customer shift rate,
DCAMS makes more revenue improvements than DCAM without considering
customer shift behaviour. Although when the shift rate is 11% the improve-
ments from DCAM to DCAMS is very low and it does not seem to improve,
when the customer shift rate increase to 31% the new system make more im-
provements. Through the tracking of the seat allocation, we can see that more
customers use the direct channel( Channel D) to purchase seats as the shift
rate increases. This phenomenon also confirms that as the shift rate increases,
the airlineâĂŹs revenue is also increasing. This result implies that airlines can
depend on promoting the customer shift behaviour to increase their revenues
Table 4.3: Results of Experiment 4.4.2
Rev .for DP 11749.4 Rev.DCAM 12218.5
Shift Rate Rev.for DCAMS Seat allocation CH.A Seat allocation CH.D Inc.rate from DP to DCAMS Inc.rate from DCAM to DCAMs
0.11 12269.8 0.4321 0.5679 4.24% 0.4%
0.21 12363.2 0.3768 0.6232 4.96% 1.23%
0.31 12452.8 0.3238 0.6762 5.64% 1.92%
In addition, we analysis the sales through the sales behaviour figure 4.3, 4.4
and 4.5. According to the three figures, we can see that direct channel can
make more improvements with the increasing shift rate. For airline direct sales
channels, its lack of customers led to them selling fewer tickets.
As we can see in Figure 4.5, the customers’ channel-shift behaviour in the
previous and mid-term plays a significant role, resulting in a certain of customers
transferring from high volume indirect channel to direct channel. And thus the
behaviour increases the airline’s revenue. The reason is that due to the DCAM’s
optimization strategy, the rejection rate of indirect channel in the early and
middle period is relatively high, so it will also lose a large number of customers.
The optimization strategy of DCAMS exactly compensates for this shortcoming.
In the final stage, indirect channels make up for the shortcomings of insufficient
direct channels, and the acceptance rate is relatively high. Therefore, the impact
of DCAMS strategy in the later stage is relatively small.
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Figure 4.3: Low Shift Rate Sales behaviour for DCAMS
Figure 4.4: Middle Shift Rate Sales behaviour for DCAMS
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For example, as the experiment of shift rate 31%, the acceptance rate in
first 50 periods is 40%. For the DCAM model, the acceptance rate in first 50
periods is only 28%. The improvement of acceptance rate in the pre-term have
an advantage for competing with other airline company.
Figure 4.5: High Shift Rate Sales behaviour for DCAMS
In conclusion, Increasing the shift rate will increase the airline’s revenue.
From the perspective of sales behaviour analysis, the application of DCAMS
strategy will increase the airline’s pre-interim acceptance rate to reduce the loss
of customers.
4.4.3 Channel-shift in different commission rate
In this experiment, We discuss the effect of the commission fee rate on the
customer channel-shift model when the shift rate is constant. Here we also
adopt double channel and one fare class example. The selling time period is
T = 100 and the total capacity is also 50. The shift rate of the example keeps
in 31%. The commission rate for the indirect channel(Channel A) is 13%, 23%,
33% and 43% and the commission rate for the direct channel(Channel D) keeps
in 0%. The experiment is simulated 1,000 times with the random demand, and
we assesses the average results.
As shown in figure 4.6, With the increase of commission rate, the channel
model that considers customer channel-shift behaviour is more profitable than
the common channel model.Therefore, when there are agents with relatively
high agency rates, the airlines adopt a model that considers the customer’s
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Figure 4.6: Revenue comparison over different commission rate
shift behaviour to bring excess profits to the company. Also considering the
customer’s shift behaviour, the airline can reduce the loss due to the increase
of agency costs through this model.
4.4.4 Channel-shift in different demand pattern
The experiment is to discuss the impact of customer transfer behaviour on the
airline’s revenue under different demand conditions. As the basic assumption
of DP model, the customer arrival rate for each time is 0.99, which represents
that there is a 99% possibility that one customer will come in each time period.
Thus, the time period can be roughly viewed as the value of total demand.
This experiment adopts the basic channel parameters of experiment 4.4.2. The
commission rate is 13% and the shift rate is 21%. The total capacity for each
example is 50, and the time period is 30,100,200, which represents the low
demand, middle demand and high demand volumes, respectively.
According to the table 4.4, We can see that in the high demand and low
demand, the model that considers the customer transfer rate gains almost the
same as the model that does not consider the customer transfer behaviour. For
the medium demand, that is, the demand matching with the accommodation,
the profit obtained from the model that considers the customer’s transfer be-
haviour is obviously higher than the model that does not consider the customer’s
transfer behaviour.
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Table 4.4: Results of Experiment 4.4.4
Time Seat allocation of CH.A Seat allocation of CH. D Revenues for DCAM Revenues for DCAMS Inc.rate
30 0.4597 0.1403 7033 7023.11 -0.14%
100 0.3763 0.6237 12218.5 12364.1 1.18 %
200 0 1.00 12958.3 13000 0.32%
Figure 4.7: Sales behaviour for low demand in DCAMS
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Although the two models have the same benefits under low demand and high
demand, the specific reasons are different. We clarify their reasons by analysing
their sales behaviour. From the low-demand sales behaviour figure(see figure
4.7, it can be seen that when the demand is not high, almost all the arriving
customers are selected for acceptance during the sales process. Therefore, there
is no customer transfer behaviour because there are no rejected customers. Be-
cause of this, the model that considers customer transfer behaviour is the same
as the model that does not consider customer transfer behaviour. From the low-
demand sales behaviour diagram, it can be seen that when the demand is not
high, almost all the arriving customers are selected for acceptance during the
sales process. Therefore, there is no customer transfer behaviour because there
are no rejected customers. Because of this, the model that considers customer
transfer behaviour is the same as the model that does not consider customer
transfer behaviour.
Figure 4.8: Sales behaviour for middle demand in DCAMS
In the case of high demand. the reason is different from the case of low
demand. We are still seeking reasons from the high demand sales behaviour
figure(See figure 4.9). As can be seen from the figure, due to sufficient de-
mand, airlines have almost rejected all indirect channels in order to maximize
the airlineâĂŹs revenue. This is why the model that considers the customer’s
transfer behaviour and the model that does not consider the customer’s transfer
behaviour have the same benefit. Because it can be seen from the figure 4.9
and 3.13 that both scenarios have almost reached the maximum benefit of the
airline.
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Figure 4.9: Sales behaviour for high demand in DCAMS
But in addition to the benefits we can see, the model that considers the
customer’s transfer behaviour produces some differences in the sales process
compared to the model that does not consider the customer’s transfer behaviour.
In both cases, we set the time to 200 time periods. We can see that in the model
that considers the customer’s transfer behaviour, the airline has completed the
sale of 50 capacities in only about 120 time periods. Under the same condition,
which does not consider the customer’s transfer behaviour, the airline needs to
sell 50 seats in around 200 time periods. This phenomenon is well explained
by our model and the actual situation. Because the model takes into account
the customer’s transfer behaviour, the demand for indirect channels that were
rejected in the previous period has shifted to direct channels. In addition to
greatly increasing the airline’s acceptance rate for demand, it also reduces overall
sales time. This has several important implications for the airline. First, as can
be seen from this case, the rejection rate of models that do not consider customer
transfer behaviour is too high. This is inconsistent with the reality and may
have an adverse effect on the airline’s demand forecast. Second, due to changes
and increases in actual demand, it may have an impact on the airline’s sales
time and the schedule of the aircraft. For example, the last case airline can
reduce sales time or change larger aircraft to increase revenue. Finally, airline
demand forecasts have a certain influence on this model.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, We studied a multi-channel single-leg capacity allocation model
that considers customer channel-shift behaviour. We propose a model that in-
troduces customer transfer behaviour into multi-channel capacity allocation.
After that, we have developed the optimal policy on the base of multi-channel
capacity allocation optimal policy. The numerical experiments enumerate the
impact of the model on the revenue management system under different cir-
cumstances and suggest various inspirations to the airlines. Firstly, Our system
revenue will increase as customer transfer rates increase. This has a great effect
on the revenue system considering multi-channel issues. When the customer
discovers that a channel cannot purchase a ticket and transfer to other channels
without any cost, there is a high probability that they will choose to purchase
tickets through other channels. For airlines, it makes sense to make forecasts
and research on the demand of transfer customer. Secondly, the model in-
creases the acceptance rate of customers to reduce customer loss caused by the
introduction of multi-channel factor. Retaining more customers means greatly
improving the competitiveness of airlines. Thirdly, The model that considers
customer transfer behaviour has better stability than the model that does not
consider customer transfer behaviour. When agency fees increase, airlines can
better reduce cost increases. Fourthly, The customer’s transfer behaviour has
a great influence on the demand forecast. Airlines can reduce sales costs by
changing sales time through changes in demand. Or increase airline revenue by
replacing larger aircraft. Finally, our model not only has better results than
the traditional revenue management model, but also has better results than the
multi-channel model. Our model is also more realistic than other models.
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5 Network capacity allocation with Multi-Channel distribution
5.1 Traditional network model in revenue management
At first, we will introduce the network revenue management in airline industry.
In modern civil aviation service industry, the airline company usually sells a
flight ticket with a set of flight legs. This kind of product is called an origin-
destination itinerary fare class combination by civil aviation service company.
The basic network problem can be showed as figure 1. Airline can sell different
leg combination products. For example, the airlines can sell a direct ticket
from Shanghai(PVG) to Frankfurt(FRA). The airlines also can sell a transfer
ticket which from Shanghai to Frankfurt and transit in Beijing(PEK). It is
usually cheaper to take transit flight than the direct flight. Why are transit
flights cheaper and how do they allocate the capacity and pricing? All this are
pointing to network revenue management, what we will talk about.
Figure 5.1: A simple airline network
When products are sold as legs combination, managing the capacities of each
leg in a network will influence the airlines’ revenue and operation. Therefore, it
is important to integrate the capacity allocation on each resource for maximizing
total revenues.
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5.1.1 Dynamic network model
This part will introduce the dynamic network model which is the most realistic
and relevant model for network revenue management. The dynamic network
model(DNM) can be found in Talluri and van Ryzin(2004, Sec 3.2). DNM
model assumes a process of airline’s selling tickets that when a request for one
product comes, the airline makes a decision whether to accept or not. The
model assumptions and model formulation is described below:
rt(x) = E[ max
ω∈(0,1){Prod(t)ω+ rt+1(x −Mω)}] (5.1)
With boundary conditions:
rT (x) = 0∀x (5.2)
rt(0) = 0∀t (5.3)
It is assumed that there are n products and m legs in the network. Each
product consists of several legs or one leg with a given price. The vector Prod(t)
is the revenue of the product when the demand comes at the t periods. There
are t = {0, ..., T} time periods in a finite selling horizon with the starting time
0 and T as the time of departure. Each time period is assumed to be small
enough so that only one arrival request in one time period. The state of the
network is described by each leg remaining capacity vector x = (x1, ..., xm).
The initial capacity vector s is s = (s1, ..., .s2). Define the incidence matrix
M = [mi j] where mi j = 1 if leg i, where i = {1, ...,m}, is used by product j,
mi j = 0 otherwise. The vector ω= (ω1, ...,ωn) is the decision binary variable.
When the arrival request from product j, where j ∈ {1, ...,n}, is accepted, the
decision variable ω j is coded to one. On the other hand, When the arrival
request from product j is rejected, the decision variable ω j is coded to zero.
The decision depends on the remaining capacity, the revenue of the product
and capacity incidence in each flight leg. The objective of each decision in each
time period is to maximize the total expected revenue. The boundary condition
(5.2) represents that when the time ends, no matter how many capacities left,
the expected revenue of T periods will be zero. The boundary condition (5.3)
indicates that the expected revenue of starting period is also zero.
Although DNM model is very close to practical situation , solving the net-
work dynamic programming optimally is almost impossible because of the curse
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of dimensionality. For example, an airline network has 30 flight legs and each
flight 150 seats. The state of airline network will be 15030. Therefore, the
problem has to rely on the approximation methods. Generally there are two
types of approximation methods. One is to use static mathematical program-
ming to simplify the network model, like determined linear programming model,
random linear programming model. Another type of methods is to decompose
the dynamic network model to single-leg model, like approximation dynamic
programming model. Next part we will introduce some approximation methods
for solving the DNM mode
5.1.2 Approximations based on dynamic network model
This part will introduce several approximation methods. In network revenue
problem, the objective of using approximation is to estimate the value function
13.1. One of the most widely used approximation is determined linear program-
ming(DLP), which is first developed by Williamson(1992). DLP model assumes
that the demand is given by the historical data or forecast. The basic DLP
model is showing blow:
rDLPt (x) =max
n∑
j=1
Prod jb j (5.4)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
Mi jb j ≤ x i (5.5)
b j ≤ MDj (5.6)
b j ≥ 0 (5.7)
The decision variables b j stands for the capacity allocation for each of the
n products. The demand is given by the mean demand MDj. The objective
of function (5.4) is to maximum revenue of each product times their capacity
allocation. The constrain (5.5) states that the capacity allocation for each
product must not exceed the capacity limit of each leg. The second constrain
(5.6) indicates that the capacity allocation must not exceed the mean demand.
The last constrain shows that the booking request must be non-negative.
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The advantages of DLP model is simple and easy to implement. However,
DLP model utilizes determined demand as the system input, ignoring the de-
mand uncertainty. Therefore some model begin to consider the demand un-
certainty, for example, a randomized linear programming was developed by
Talluri and Van Ryzin(1999). Next part we will introduce randomized linear
programming.
The difference between randomized linear programming(RLP) and deter-
mined linear programming is demand input. RLP approximation incorporates
the random demand RD information replacing the determined demand MDj in
constrain (5.6). The approximation linear programming to the value function
is below:
rRLPt (x) =max
n∑
j=1
Prod jb j (5.8)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
Mi jb j ≤ x i (5.9)
b j ≤ RDj (5.10)
b j ≥ 0 (5.11)
Although the RLP model seems like DLP model, RLP model provide a so-
lution to consider the demand uncertainty. And also because of the similarity
of DLP model, RLP model can be easily applied into traditional revenue sys-
tems. The RLP also was proved that the result is better than the DLP model
in some test bed. The paper also mentioned there are some variance reduction
techniques to improve the efficiency of the system in the future studies.
5.1.3 Summary
After several introduction of network revenue management model, we know that
network management can be used in some service companies which sell products
consisting of a combination of a bundle of resources and fare class. For instance,
airlines those offer multi-leg services, hotel renting rooms for multi-nights, and
80 5 Network capacity allocation with Multi-Channel distribution
car rental for multi-days. Network revenue management is important for these
perishable products service company. Comparing the single-leg revenue man-
agement, computation complexity and the scale of network is the key challenge
in network. As we mentioned in section 5.1.1, general dynamic programming is
hard to be solved because of curse of dimensionality. Therefore, some approxi-
mations are developed for solving the large scale of network problem.
As mentioned above, the computation of the traditional network revenue
management has already been very complex. How to integrate the channel fac-
tor problem into the revenue management problem and solve the computational
complexity problem has become the key role to solve the problem of the channel
network. We first propose a dynamic revenue management with multi-channel
model based on the revenue management network model. At the same time,
due to the computational complexity of the dynamic model, we propose a de-
terministic linear programming model to solve the original problem. Therefore,
we have simplified complex mathematical problems into solutions that can be
applied in the industrial field.
In the next section, we will introduce our new network model and approxi-
mation method. In the end, we will use the experiments to illustrate the results
and give some implications.
5.2 Network capacity allocation with Multi-Channel distribution
5.2.1 Problem Definition and model
Assume the airline company selling n products(itineraries) in a m resources(legs)
network. A product is a combination of a bundle of resources and fare class.
Each product j has its price p j, where j ∈ {1, ...,n}. The products are sold by
h ∈ {1, ..., l} channels. Define the incidence matrix A = [ai j] where ai j = 1 if
resource i, i ∈ {1, ...,m}, is used by product j, ai j = 0 otherwise. We denoted
that A j is the set of legs used by product j and Ai is the set of products that
use resource i. Therefore, the notation i ∈ A j indicates that leg i is used by
product j, and j ∈ Ai indicates that product j uses resource i. The initial seats
of the resource s is s ∈ {s1, ..., sm}. The state of the network is described by the
remaining seats vector x ∈ {x1, ..., xm}. There are t = {0, ...T} time periods in
a finite selling horizon. Each time period is small enough such that maximum
one customer will arrive in one period. Time starts from t = 0 and ends at
t = T . In each period, the customer arrives at h channel and require j product
with probability λ jh. It holds that λ0 +
∑n
j=1
∑l
h=1λ jh = 1, where λ0 is the
probability that no customer arrives at that time period. When one seat is
sold by channel h, the airline pays ChPj commission fee to channel h. At the
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beginning of each period, when one demand comes in one channel requiring one
product, the airline company first decides whether to accept the channel request
or not. The decision is denoted by a binary variable wht . After that, the airline
company makes the second decision about product request. The decision is
denoted by another binary variable u j t . If u j t = 1, the airline company accepts
this product and 0 otherwise. After the customer request has been accepted,
the airline company obtains the revenue (1− Ch)Pj. The decision depends on
the remaining seats vector x , each time period t, the channel revenues rate Ch
and the revenue of products Pj. The objective is to maximize the total expected
revenues in a selling horizon from the airline company’s perspective. Now we
formulated the decision problem as a dynamic programming: Parameters:
• M : the set of resources in a network, indexed by i.
• N : the set of products in a network, indexed by j.
• L: the set of channels in a network, indexed by h.
• A= [ai j]: where ai j = 1 if resource i is used by product j, ai j = 0 otherwise.
• x = (x1, ..., xm): state vector of resource capacities, if product j is sold,
state change x − A j.
• t: represent each time period.
• T : finite horizon periods.
• s: initial seats od the resource, s ∈ {s1, ..., sm}
• P(t) = (P1(t), ..., Pn(t)): revenue of the product, If Pj(t) = Pj > 0, this
indicates a request for product j occurred and its associated price is Pj; If
Pj(t) = 0, this indicates there is no request for product j.
• C = (C1, ...,Ch): Commission rate in channel h.
• λ jh(t): the probability of customers arrival in products j and channelh in
time periods t.
• wht : the channel decision binary indicator such that wht = 1 if the airline
company accepts channel h request in time period t, and 0 otherwise.
• u j t : the product decision binary indicator such that u j t = 1 if the airline
company accepts product j request in time period t, and 0 otherwise.
• Vt(x): the maximum expected revenue of rest capacity x in periods t.
Based on the parameters, the Bellman equation is then written as:
Vt(x) = E[ max
u j t∈(0,1),wht∈(0,1)
{Pju j t(1− Ch)Wht
+Vt+1(x − Au j twht)}] (5.12)
with boundary conditions
VT (x) = 0 ∀0≤ x ≤ s (5.13)
Vt(0) = 0 ∀0≤ t ≤ T (5.14)
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The boundary condition (5.13) represents that when the last period T comes,
the airline will lost revenues of remaining seats. The boundary condition (5.14)
illustrates that when the initial seats of flight has been sold out before time
ends, the airline will not make any revenues. According to the definitions of
λ jh, the Bellman equation also can be rewritten as:
Vt(x) = Vt+1(x) +
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
λ jh(t)[((1− Ch)Pj
+Vt+1(x − A j)− Vt+1(x))+] (5.15)
5.2.2 Approximation method
For any large scale network solving the DP model in exactly is practically hope-
less because of the curse of dimensionality. For example, an airline network has
30 flight legs and each flight has 150 seats. The state of airline network will be
15030. Therefore, the problem has to rely on the approximation methods. One
general approach is to use a deterministic approximation, in which stochastic
demand are replaced by their mean demand. For example, the determinis-
tic linear programming model(DLP) is simplified from the traditional dynamic
network modelWilliamson(1992). Additionally the choice-bases linear program-
ming model also was a deterministic approximation approach for choice-based
DP formulation Liu and Van Ryzin(2008). Therefore, we also propose a de-
terministic Linear programming model to solve our channel network DP model
and we call it NCDLP. In our NCDLP model, we let D be the random vector of
cumulative future demand at time t, and E(D) its mean vector. In particular,
Dj represents the aggregate demand over the remaining t time periods and Dh
represents the aggregate demand over the remaining t time periods. We denote
y j as the booking limit of capacity for product j. Additionally, we denote zh j
as the booking limit of capacity for channel h. When a flight ticket is sold from
channel h, the airline company will pay commission fee ChPj.
Additional Parameters:
• y j: the booking limit of product j.
• zh j: the booking limit of channel h for product j.
• E(Dj): the aggregate mean demand of product j.
• E(Dh): the aggregate mean demand of channel h.
For any given capacity x at time t, the deterministic linear programming
model can be formulated as:
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VLP(x) =max
∑
j∈N
Pj(y j −
∑
h∈L
Chzh j) (5.16)
subject to:∑
j∈N
Ai j y j ≤ x i ∀i ∈ M (5.17)∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Ai jzh j ≤ x i ∀i ∈ M (5.18)
y j ≤ E(Dj) ∀ j ∈ N (5.19)∑
j∈N
zh j ≤ E(Dh) ∀h ∈ L (5.20)
y j =
∑
h∈L
zh j ∀ j ∈ N (5.21)
y j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N (5.22)
zh j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N ,∀h ∈ L (5.23)
In the DLP, the objective function is to maximize the total revenue minus
channel commission fee. The constraint (5.17) states that the booking limit
allocated to product booking requests must not violate the capacity limit on
each resource i. The constraint (5.18) states that the booking limit for chan-
nel requests also must not violate the capacity limit on each resource i. The
constraint (5.19) states that the booking limit of each product can not be over
the demand of each product. The constraint (5.20) indicates that each chan-
nel’s booking limit also can not be more than each channel’s demand. The
constraint (5.21) represents that each booking limit of product must equal to
the sum of channel’s booking limit on each product. The constraint (5.22) and
(5.23) demonstrate that all booking limit are nonnegative number.
5.3 Asymptotic optimality of the NCDLP
As the Cooper(2002) shows that the he traditional DLP has the asymptotic
property that its solution is asymptotically optimal for the network stochastic
DP problem. Here, we will show the same property holds for NCDLP.
To do so ,we restate the stochastic problem basing on the DP formulation
5.12. We define y∗ as the optimal solution and y∗j as the allocation capacity of
the each fare class j. Define V ∗ as the optimal expected revenue over the entire
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time horizon when applying the optimal solution y∗. With these definitions,
the stochastic control problem can be written as:
V ∗ =max E[
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1− Ch)min{y∗j ,Dj}] (5.24)
We first show that the objective value of the network channel determined
linear problem 5.16 is the upper bound of the optimal expected revenue of the
stochastic control problem 5.24.
Proposition 1 V ∗ ≤ VLP
Proof 1 For any j ∈ 1, ...,n, we will have a cumulative vector of capacity allo-
cation y that satisfies:
∑
j∈N
Ai j y j ≤ x i
And
y j ≤ Dj
According to the Jensen’s inequality,
V ∗ =max E[
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1−Ch)min{y∗j ,Dj} ≤max
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1−Ch)E[min{y∗j ,Dj}]
Additionally, we can know that max
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L Pj(1− Ch)E[min{y∗j ,Dj}] is
a feasible solution of VLP . So we can get that:
V ∗ ≤ VLP
Therefore, we can prove that NCDLP is the upper bound of the stochastic DP
problem.
Next, we will prove that the upper bound NCDLP is asymptotically tight to
the stochastic problem as both capacity and demand scaled up proportionately.
We consider a sequence of these problems and indexed them as ϑ = 1,2, ....
Additionally, in the ϑ-scaled problem, the capacity is ϑx and the demand is
ϑE[Dj]. For the ϑ-scaled problem, when ϑ = 1, the problem can be regarded as
the original problem 5.16 and 5.24. We also define V LP
ϑ
as the expected revenue
of the ϑ-scaled NCDLP problem and V ∗
ϑ
as the optimal revenue of the ϑ-scaled
stochastic problem. We will get the property:
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Proposition 2
lim
ϑ→∞
1
ϑ
V ∗ϑ = limϑ→∞
1
ϑ
V LPϑ = VLP
Proof 2 Firstly , we can define a sequence of the linear programs analogous to
the function 5.16 as following equation:
V LPϑ =max
∑
j∈N
Pj(ϑ y j −
∑
h∈L
ϑChzh j)
As the proposition 1, the V LP
ϑ
is also the upper bound of V ∗
ϑ
in the ϑ-scaled
problem. Therefore, ϑ y∗j is the optimal solution to the scaled NCDLP problem.
And we can get the ϑ-scaled stochastic problem as following:
V ∗ϑ =max E[
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1− Ch)min{ϑ y∗j ,Dj(ϑ)}]
Next we divide both formulation by ϑ and let ϑ→∞, we can get:
lim
ϑ→∞
1
ϑ
V ∗ϑ = limϑ→∞
1
ϑ
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1− Ch)min{ϑ y∗j ,Dj(ϑ)}
= lim
ϑ→∞
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1− Ch)min{y∗j , 1ϑDj(ϑ)}
When ϑ→∞, 1ϑDj(ϑ) = E[Dj] So:
=
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1− Ch)min{y∗j , E[Dj]}
=
∑
j∈N
∑
h∈L
Pj(1− Ch)y∗j }
=
∑
j∈N
Pj(y
∗
j −
∑
h∈L
Chz
∗
h j)
= VLP
Therefore, the proven results shows that , the optimal revenue of the ϑ-scaled
problem converges in ϑ infinity to the upper bound VLP . Thus, the revenue of
the determined linear programming can converge to the optimal revenue.
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5.4 Numerical examples
In this section, we conducted numerical experiment using an airline network to
verify the performance of our model. In figure 5.2, a small airline network has
three cities and three flight legs.
Figure 5.2: Network for experiment
Additionally each flight has its own capacities which are shown in table 5.1.
Each flight consists of two fare classes, so the airline network has six products
as in table 5.2. Mean demands of each product are assumed as 1.5 demand ratio
which equals to 1.5 times of capacity.
Table 5.1: Resource Characteristics for Experiment
Resource Leg Capacity
1 A-B 30
2 B-C 16
3 A-C 15
In the experiment, we illustrate the traditional determined linear program-
ming model(DLP, see Williamson,1992) as the benchmark for the comparison
purpose. More specifically, DLP model only can allocate the capacity in fare
class. The products and resource characteristics are the same as the new chan-
nel DLP model. The channel part in the reality depends on the rule of first come
first serve as we mentioned above. The products and resource characteristics
are the same as the new channel DLP model. The data in Table 5.3 are shown
the channel characteristics. In the example, we assume that the airlines have
two channels: channel 1 which represents indirect channel such as travel agency
whereas channel 2 represents direct channel such as airline websites. These two
channels differ in terms of their demand and commission rate. To test the effect
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Table 5.2: Products Characteristics for Experiment
Products Origin-Destination Class Fare Mean Demand
1 A-C H 1200 9
2 A-B-C H 800 9
3 A-B H 600 12
4 A-C L 800 14
5 A-B-C L 500 15
6 A-B L 300 9
of channel on airlines revenue, we run 5 instances with different commission
rate(See Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Channel Characteristics for Experiment
Channel Commission Rate Mean Demand
1 0.15,0.25,0.35,0.45,0.55 54
2 0 14
As shown in figure 5.3, the new channel DLP model makes more revenues
than the traditional DLP model in different commission rate situation. For
example, when the commission rate is 0.15, the new model has 3.99% revenue
improvements. With the commission rate increasing, the new model can make
more revenue improvements. According to this point, new model can keep the
revenues more stable when the commission rate increase.
5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have studied the problem of capacity control with flight
fare class and multi-channel distribution in the network environment. The net-
work dynamic model of Talluri and Van Ryzin(1998) is a general and traditional
capacity allocation model, which is widely used in airlines industry. Here, we
have extended their model to solve the network model under the multi-channel
environment. We proposed a new network dynamic model and introduced the
channel factor into the new model. As we mentioned in the section 5.2.2, the
dynamic programming model is hardly to be solved under the large scale net-
work environment. Therefore, we have developed an approximation method to
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Figure 5.3: Revenue comparison in different commission rate
solve the problem instead of dynamic programming model. The approxima-
tion method is the determined linear programming model which is widely used
to solve the network dynamic programming problem in revenue management.
The numerical experiments illustrate that the determined linear program can
be solved optimally. Additionally , the results proved that the network model
which considered channel factor can make more improvements on revenues for
airlines than the traditional network model. Some implications from single-leg
model have also been showed in the channel network model. For example, the
model which considered channel factor make the revenue system more stable
when the commission fee changes than the traditional model. This implications
also can be showed in the results of new network model. Therefore, the key
contribution of this study is that we introduce the channel distribution into the
traditional network revenue management. On the base of this we proposed an
approximation method to make this problem be solved and make the model
be used in practical. Thus, this study improves the development of revenue
management.
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6 Conclusion and future study
6.1 Conclusion
With the rapid development of e-commerce, it has brought opportunities and
challenges to every industry. The biggest challenge among these is the change of
marketing channels.The airlines marketing channels are different compared with
marketing channels of traditional products. Airlines compete tremendously in
increasing customer volume and maintaining market share in a limited time
period. Hence, airlines utilize many channels to reach customers in order
to enhance the sales opportunities. However, with the development of OTA,
the airlines have to pay high commission fee for each ticket they sold. Al-
though the airlines realize that this is a serious problem for airlines and have
adopted strategies to increase the sales proportion of direct channel, the strate-
gies is not obviously useful. Under this current situation, airlines have to pay a
large amount of commission fee for the indirect channel distribution every year.
Hence, how to reduce this cost of channel distribution has become a focus issue
from the perspective of some airline companies.
At the same time, the airline’s 40-year revenue management strategy has
also required radical changes to adapt to the new Internet environment. In
the beginning, revenue management is used typically to determine how many
seats should be reserved and offered for each class at different prices in one
aircraft cabin. Since the application of this management technology, American
airlines have acquired more profits in 1980s during which period almost all other
airlines had a great deficit. Although revenue management often assumes that
cost is not considered because of the high fixed cost and low variable cost, this
assumption does not necessarily true concern the cost of channel distribution
in nowadays market. Eventually, the channel cost will significantly affect the
revenue of selling tickets, and therefore this is essential to investigate how the
channel distribution affects the decision making of airlines’ revenue management
system.
On this basis, this thesis has done related research and reached the following
conclusions:
Firstly, we have studied the problem of capacity control in the single-leg flight
fare class and multi-channel distribution. We proposed a dynamic programming
model for integrating the fare class capacity allocation and the channel capacity
deployment. After that, we have explored the optimal policy for the integrated
model to maximum the airlines revenues and proposed several properties cor-
responding to the optimal policy. Furthermore, we proposed a customer-shift
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behaviour model on the basis of the integrated model and discovered the optimal
policy for that. The numerical experiments illustrate the different applications
of the model and provide several implications for airline companies. Firstly,
our system can keep the revenues more stable when channel commission rates
increase. This implication decreases the lost revenue risk by contracting with
the channel and holding the dominant position in airline market. Secondly,
multiple indirect sales channels will not reduce airline company revenues, and,
conversely, more indirect channels might bring more profits for the airline com-
pany. Therefore, the airlines should introduce more channels to improve their
revenues. Thirdly, the demand forecast dominates a significant position in our
system. The accurate prediction of demand improves the revenues for the air-
line company. After that, our system integrates the channel and fare class, and
there is not an obvious conflict between the channel and fare class allocation.
The airline company can realize channel control on the basis of the revenue
system. However, we need to note the observation that the increased rate of
the DCAM with multi-fare and without multi-fare brings a small difference.
This might be due to the combined but complex effects of the fare class and
the channel distribution. As discussed in Section 5.4, the assumption of cus-
tomer arrival is one explanation for the result. A more thorough investigation is
needed in a future study. Thus, our study solves a mathematical problem, and
it has value for practical use. Finally, all applications we proposed have better
performance in dealing with the problem of multi-fare and multi-channel capac-
ity control than the classic independent system. The key contribution of this
study is that it is the first attempt to integrate the capacity allocation decision
and distribution channel decision in order to improve the revenue management.
The modelling framework provides a basis for investigating relevant issues in fu-
ture studies. The optimal policy together with the observations from numerical
examples brings insights on the directions where revenues can be improved in
practice. Thus, from both the theoretical and practical perspectives, this study
contributes to the knowledge development in the field.
Secondly, we studied a multi-channel single-leg capacity allocation model
that considers customer channel-shift behaviour. We propose a model that
introduces customer transfer behaviour into multi-channel capacity allocation.
After that, we have developed the optimal policy on the base of multi-channel
capacity allocation optimal policy. The numerical experiments enumerate the
impact of the model on the revenue management system under different cir-
cumstances and suggest various inspirations to the airlines. Firstly, Our system
revenue will increase as customer transfer rates increase. This has a great effect
on the revenue system considering multi-channel issues because the channel’s
transfer behaviour has no loss to the customer itself. When the customer dis-
covers that a channel cannot purchase a ticket and transfer to other channels
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without any cost, there is a high probability that they will choose to purchase
tickets through other channels. For airlines, it makes sense to collect trans-
fer customer demands and make some research. Secondly, the model increases
the acceptance rate of customers to reduce customer loss caused by the intro-
duction of multi-channel factor. Retaining more customers means improving
the competitiveness of airlines. Thirdly, The model that considers customer
transfer behaviour has better stability than the model that does not consider
customer transfer behaviour. When agency fees increase, airlines can better
reduce cost increases. Fourthly, The customer’s transfer behaviour has a great
influence on the demand forecast. Airlines can reduce sales costs by changing
sales time through accurate demand forecasting or increase airline revenue by
replacing larger aircraft. Finally, our model not only has better results than
the traditional revenue management model, but also has better results than the
multi-channel model. Our model is also more realistic than other models.
Thirdly, we have studied the problem of capacity control with flight fare
class and multi-channel distribution in the network environment. The network
dynamic model of Talluri and van Ryzin(1999) is a general and traditional ca-
pacity allocation model, which is widely used in airlines industry. Here, we
have extended their model to solve the network model under the multi-channel
environment. We proposed a new network dynamic model and introduced the
channel factor into the new model. As we mentioned in the section 4, the
dynamic programming model is hardly to be solved under the large scale net-
work environment. Therefore, we have developed an approximation method to
solve the problem instead of dynamic programming model. The approxima-
tion method is the determined linear programming model which is widely used
to solve the network dynamic programming problem in revenue management.
The numerical experiments illustrate that the determined linear program can
be solved optimally. Additionally , the results proved that the network model
which considered channel factor can make more improvements on revenues for
airlines than the traditional network model. Some implications from single-leg
model have also been showed in the channel network model. For example, the
model which considered channel factor make the revenue system more stable
when the commission fee changes than the traditional model. This implications
also can be showed in the results of new network model. Therefore, the key
contribution of this study is that we introduce the channel distribution into the
traditional network revenue management. On the base of this we proposed an
approximation method to make this problem be solved and make the model
be used in practical. Thus, this study improves the development of revenue
management.
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6.2 Future study
There are many possible directions for future study in the channel and ca-
pacity allocation. Understanding the competitive behaviours between different
channels under the channel and fare system is a significant topic for future
investigation. In our model, we only considered capacity allocation and deter-
mined price strategy. As a further extension, price strategy can be included in
the revenue system. Except for the airline industry, other industries (such as
the hotel industry, high speed rail industry, car rental industry and some retail
markets) are also of interest for the application of the knowledge developed in
this study. However, we need to note that our experiments only examines in a
small network. In the future study, the model need to be testified in a large and
more complicated network. Apart from this, the future study also can consider
the competition effect between different channels.
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